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Why Doesn't She Leave?
The Collision of First Amendment
Rights and Effective Court Remedies
for Victims of Domestic Violence
by LAURIE S. KOHN*
Why doesn't she leave? This is a commonly asked question by
people confounded by the phenomenon of women who stay in
battering relationships despite the abuse they endure.' Psychologists
and victims'2 advocates also grapple with this question because the
* Visiting Associate Professor and Assistant Director, Domestic Violence Clinic,
Georgetown University Law Center. LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center; A.B., Harvard College. I am grateful to Deborah
Epstein and Linda Hirshman for their extremely thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of
this Article. I want to thank Chris Murphy for his boundless support and assistance with
every phase of this process. I am also indebted to the large group of friends, family, and
colleagues who debated and discussed this topic with me over the past year. Finally, this
project could not have been completed without the unflagging research assistance of
Monique Sherman, Jennifer Gray, and Heidi Hertel.
1. James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women... Still: Unfulfilled Promises of
Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1149, 1169 (1995)
(referring to the frequent inquiries into why women stay in battering relationships); Joan
S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives
on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1317 (1993)
(alluding to the omnipresence of the "why didn't she leave" inquiry); Martha R. Mahoney,
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1,
5 (1991) (asserting that the question shapes social and legal analysis of battering); Steve
Kemper, When to Leave, HART. COURANT, June 21, 1998, at 7 (presenting an interview of
an expert on domestic violence in which the third question focused on why battered
women do not leave); Susan Reinhardt, Domestic Violence; It Began with Control, Ended
with Battering/Unusual Event Tells of Shattered Lives, ASHEVILLE CIT. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1997, at C1 (raising the question of why women do not leave abusive relationships).
2. Throughout this Article, I will interchangeably use victim and survivor to refer to
individuals who endure violence in their intimate relationships. During my work with this
population, I have found little consensus about which term most accurately and
appropriately describes their status. Primarily, it is important to note that these
individuals are three-dimensional figures whose identities are not monolithically dictated
by the nature of their relationships. It is for the ease of the reader that I reduce the phases
paradox often casts doubt on the credibility of victims and the
efficacy of legal and social science responses.
Despite the persistence of the question, social science literature
is replete with reasons why a victim does not or cannot leave a
battering relationship.' Commonly cited explanations include lack of
financial resources;4 fear of physical retribution;5 lack of access to
information about options for escape;6 enduring love for the batterer
and belief he will change;7 learned helplessness;8 and depression.9
This Article, however, focuses on a pervasive and previously
unexamined reason: the victim's fear that the batterer will publicize
truthful confidential information that will hurt her. ° If the victim
"individual who has been battered" or "individual who has survived violence by an
intimate partner" to victim and survivor.
3. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 5 (stating that much scholarship has been generated to
address the central question of why she does not leave). See, e.g., Truss, supra note 1
(examining the dynamics of power and control that trap women in battering
relationships).
4. Maria L. Imperial, Self Sufficiency and Safety: Welfare Reform for Victims of
Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 3, 3 (1997) (stating that many
victims of domestic violence are financially dependant on their batterers whose abuse
undermines their efforts to keep their jobs); Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic
Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection,
and Voice, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1995) (citing the financial pressures on
both high income and low income women who consider leaving battering relationships).
5. Working Group, Charging Battered Women with "Failure to Protect": Still
Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 858-59 (2000) ("If she takes [the
batterer's] threats seriously, and statistics show she should, then she may conclude it is
safer for her and her children in the short term to stay in the relationship."). See generally
Joyce Klemperer, Symposium on Reconceptualizing Violence against Women by Intimate
Partners: Critical Issues: Programs for Battered Women - What Works?, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1171, 1178 (1995) (citing the need for safety as the most critical issue for a woman fleeing
an abusive relationship).
6. Margulies, supra note 4, at 1077 (chronicling the significant barriers victims
encounter in accessing social services and legal assistance when leaving a battering
relationship).
7. Even despite full access to resources for escape, some victims will simply stay in a
battering relationship because they still love the abuser. A woman will be the hostage of
her own ambivalence: loving the abuser, but hating the abuse. See generally Nan Seuffert,
Domestic Violence, Disclosures of Romantic Love, and Complex Personhood in the Law,
23 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 211 (1999) (exploring the challenges this ambivalence creates
in legal discourse).
8. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (2d ed. 1980)
(introducing the application of learned helplessness theory to victims of domestic violence
to explain why they may stay in a battering relationship).
9. Kelly Grace Monacella, Comment, Supporting a Defense of Duress: The
Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 699, 704 (1997) (explaining
that a battered woman's passivity can be attributable to depression).
10. Throughout this Article, I will often refer to individuals who are battered as
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were to seek the court's protection," most state courts have the
authority to prohibit the batterer from divulging the information.
Under state law, most judges can issue a domestic violence protection
order that includes a restriction on the batterer's speech. But are
these restrictions constitutional?
This Article examines the potential constitutional barriers to the
issuance of this relief.
Part I will define the scope of the problem by examining case
studies of three victims who typify the victims in need of such
protection. They possess the characteristics that batterers most
commonly threaten to reveal:12 HIV status; sexual orientation;13 and
immigration status.
Part II looks to the speech restriction itself against the backdrop
females and the perpetrators as males. This label is only shorthand and is not intended to
cast into doubt the existence of female on male battering. While men are victims of
intimate violence and women the batterers, the statistics bear out that in the majority of
cases, the reverse is true. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE,
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIME (2001) ("Intimate violence is primarily a crime against
women - in 1998, females were the victims of 72% of intimate murders and the victims of
about 85% of nonlethal intimate violence."); OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T.
OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY
(2000) (providing the statistic that 1.5 million women as compared with 834,732 men are
raped and/or physically assaulted by intimate partners annually); Marta B. Verela,
Protection of Domestic Violence Victims under the New York Human Rights Law's
Provisions Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1231, 1234 (2000) (stating that three quarters of all victims of domestic violence are
women). This shorthand is not intended to denigrate the experiences of men who are
beaten by their partners, nor call into question that such battering exists. Furthermore,
gender short hand is not intended to deny the existence of same-sex battering. Same-sex
battering exists and is often the context in which the dynamic of threats of revealing
confidential information arises, as will be discussed later.
11. Often victims who do seek the court's protection later withdraw their petitions for
protection because of the on-set of such threats.
12. 1 base this conclusion on my own experience of working with hundreds of victims
of domestic violence in the District of Columbia over the past five years and the
observations of those whom I have interviewed who work with victims on a daily basis in
D.C. Superior Court.
13. By arguing that speech "outing" an individual for being gay or HIV positive is
harassment and should be enjoined, one risks perpetuating stereotypes that the allegation
should be one associated with shame. However, I make no normative statement regarding
the appropriate societal reaction to this information. Instead, my analysis is descriptive of
common societal reactions to information relating to HIV and sexual orientation. I see
the need for domestic violence speech injunctions based on HIV positive and/or gay,
lesbian or bisexual victims' fears about this societal reaction. As one commentator stated,
"[t]o deny the existence of prejudice because acknowledging it seems politically incorrect
does a disservice to society." David H. Pollack, Comment, Forced Out of the Closet. Sexual
Orientation and the Legal Dilemma of "Outing", 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 711,733 (1992).
Fall 20011
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
of First Amendment jurisprudence, analyzing what level of scrutiny a
court would accord this type of restriction. Part III analyzes the First
Amendment value of the speech in question, analogizing to
jurisprudence regarding blackmail statutes. Part IV examines
doctrines in which courts have considered First Amendment
challenges to restrictions that protect state interests similar to those at
issue in the domestic violence context. Those interests include
privacy, child welfare, and protection from domestic violence. Next,
Part V briefly refers to prior restraint caselaw to determine if this
injunction would present an invalid prior restraint on speech. In Part
VI, the Article presents the parameters of a domestic violence speech
restriction that is most likely to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Finally, the Article concludes by arguing that although such
injunctions might encounter significant legal challenges, they are
normatively important and constitutionally sound relief.
I. Scope of the Problem
A. HIV status
Joanne" met Larry when she was 30 years old. After a year of
peace and relative happiness, Joanne and her son, a child from a
previous relationship, moved in with Larry. Not long thereafter,
Joanne tested positive for HIV. Despite Joanne's frequent inquiries
into Larry's health status and his representations that he annually
tested negative for HIV, Joanne suspected that Larry had infected
her. And then the violence began. Larry punched her repeatedly in
the face when she upset him. Once he pinned her against a wall by
her throat, strangling her until she passed out.
Although Joanne knew she had to protect herself and her son
from this violence, she felt isolated from the rest of the world. Aside
from her doctors, Larry was the only person who knew that she was
HIV positive. Joanne did not trust anyone else with this sensitive
information because the potential effect of its publicity on her
employment as a childcare provider would be devastating. Larry
understood this. At first his threats were subtle, but soon, whenever
14. All client narratives consist of various components of several client stories that I
have encountered in my extensive practice in the District of Columbia Superior Court's
Domestic Violence Unit. Amalgamating client attributes and assigning pseudonyms are
intended to protect client privacy. For an enlightening discussion of the complexity of
using client narratives, see Binny Miller, Give them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 3 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994).
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he suspected Joanne was preparing to move out, he would tell her
that if she did not stay, he would write a letter to her employer, she
would lose her job, and she would never again work with children.
Joanne would reconsider and stay with Larry, frightened that her
employers might well react with panic to her health status despite the
precautions that she took in protecting the children she cared for
from transmission. Larry would also threaten to contact people at her
son's school. Joanne feared that this would result in her son being
ostracized by his peers and teachers.
Joanne finally dared to leave when her son walked in the
bedroom to see Larry holding a knife to her throat. The ten year-old
called the police and the next day Joanne went to court to petition for
protection.
This harrowing example is by no means uncommon in abusive
relationships. Literature examining same-sex battering routinely
refers to the fear of HIV "outing" as being a primary cause of the
secrecy that characterizes same-sex domestic violence. 5 Victims often
decide against seeking legal protection because they are concerned
that their batterers, in return, will publicize this information to people
who will take discriminatory actions against them. Victims might
experience detrimental repercussions both professionally and socially
due to fear of HIV transmission and/or homophobia. 6
B. Sexual orientation
Jacques came to court to file for a protection order after his
former partner, Mike, had kidnapped him, driven him to a secluded
park off the highway, and attempted to slit his throat. Abuse had
characterized their relationship for well over a year before it
culminated in this kidnapping. Jacques was the only son of a large
African immigrant family. The family was extremely close and with
the exception of Jacques all of the adult children lived at home.
Although Jacques had moved out a year before to live with Mike, his
15. Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere while
Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 325, 337 (1999)
(emphasizing that a batterer's threats of "outing" often extend to HIV status); Joseph
Hanania, Next L.A.: A Hidden World of Violence: The Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian
Center Launches a Program to Publicize and Help Prevent Domestic Abuse, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1996, at B2 (discussing that batterers may monopolize on societal biases by
threatening to reveal the HIV status of fleeing partners to employers).
16. Laurie S. Kohn, Infecting Attorney-Client Confidentiality: The Ethics of HPV
Disclosure, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 561 n. 105 (1996) (reviewing the professional and
social effects of fear of AIDS transmission).
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family did not know he was gay. In their minds, Mike was their son's
roommate. Because Jacques was their only son, his parents had
pinned on him all of their hopes of generations of American children
carrying on their family name. Knowing this, Jacques had determined
never to inform his parents about his sexual orientation.
This was the technique by which Mike coerced Jacques to remain
involved with him despite the abuse. Mike had easy access to
Jacques's family and could easily follow through with his frequent
threats to "out" Jacques to his parents. Jacques thought that he could
remain in a relationship with Mike long enough to deter him from
following through with his threats. Ultimately, however, staying
became too dangerous.
Fearing homophobic responses, gay men and women often hide
their sexual orientation from employers and family members." This
fear gives batterers a manipulative tool to force victims to endure
additional abuse. As long as a victim knows that a batterer intends to
publicize this information and finds his threats credible, he may well
stay in an abusive relationship rather than face the potential
repercussions, 8  which could include loss of child custody,
employment, and family and personal relationships.'9
17. NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORT ON
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, (Oct. 6, 1998) (stating
the prevalence of the fear of homophobic reaction by family members), available at
http://www.lambda.org/dv97.html.
18. Vaughn v. Odom, 1988 WL 15711 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1988) (considering a
complaint for outrageous conduct and extortionate threats against defendant who, when
plaintiff attempted to terminate the relationship, threatened to tell plaintiff's family and
employers about their homosexual affair); Knauer, supra note 15, at 337 ("Homophobia in
the United States often prompts (or forces) individuals in same-sex relationships to
conceal their relationship or at least the sex of their partner."); Claire Renzetti, Violence
in Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in GENDER AND VIOLENCE 287 (Laura L. O'Toole &
Jessica R. Schiffman eds., 1997) (Claire Renzetti found that 21% of lesbian battered
women in her study reported that their partners threatened to "out" them.); Kathleen
Finley Duthu, Why Doesn't Anyone Talk about Gay and Lesbian Domestic Violence?, 18
T. JEFFERSON. L. REV. 23, 31-32 (1996) (illustrating the powerful tool of homophobia
used by same-sex batterers); Ros Davidson, Gay-on-Gay Violence: The Gay Community's
Dirty Secret-Domestic Violence-Is Finally Coming out of the Closet, SALON MAG., Feb.
1997 (citing threats of "outing" as a powerful tool in battering relationships), available at
www.salon.com/archived/1997/news.html. See also Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without
Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate
Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 594-96 (1996) ("Another difference in the
experience of battering for abused lesbian and gay victims is an even greater relative
isolation than that experienced by abused heterosexual women, which intensifies the
victim's vulnerability and the batterer's power.").
19. Knauer, supra note 15, at 337 (chronicling the potential costs of "outing"); Duthu,
supra note 18, at 31 (elucidating the possible effects of sexual orientation status publicity).
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C. Immigration status
Marielle typifies the dilemma facing a significant number of
immigrant women. An immigrant from Venezuela, she married a
man who had already obtained his citizenship. Although her
immigration application was pending, Marielle had not yet obtained
her green card. Over the course of their relationship, her husband
repeatedly cheated on her and raped her. He regularly shoved and
pushed Marielle around their apartment when he was angry.
Whenever she gathered her belongings in a suitcase or tried to call
the police, her husband would tell her that he would make sure she
would be deported if she left. When he began stalking her wherever
she went, Marielle finally determined that she must risk deportation
to maintain her safety.
According to a survey of Latina immigrants in the Washington
D.C. metropolitan area, threats of deportation are a prevalent and
powerful tool used in battering relationships.' The respondents
ranked fear of reports to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and fear of deportation as the two most powerful deterrents to
leaving an abusive relationship." Immigrant women must choose
between two intimidating prospects: an abusive home life or
deportation.22 The U.S. House of Representatives recognized this
catch-22 for victims when it debated the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994:
Domestic battery problems can become terribly exacerbated in
marriages where one spouse is not a citizen, and the non-
citizen's legal status depends on his or her marriage to the
abuser. Current law fosters domestic violence in such
situations by placing full and complete control of the alien
spouse's ability to gain permanent legal status in the hands of
the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident can, but is not required to, file a petition
requesting that his or her spouse be granted legal status based
20. Mary Ann Dutton, Leslye E. Orloff & Giselle Aguilar Hass, Characteristics of
Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas:
Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 245, 259, 292-93
(2000). See also Leslye E. Orloff, Deeana Jang & Catherine F. Klein, With No Place to
Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313, 325
n. 52 (1995) (citing the study and that the batterer may use threats of deportation to trap
her in a battering relationship).
21. Dutton, supra note 20, at 293.
22. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993) ("[Battered immigrant women] fear both
continued abuse if they stay with their batterers and deportation if they attempt to
leave.").
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on a valid marriage. Also, the citizen or lawful permanent
resident can revoke such a petition at any time prior to the
issuance of permanent or conditional residency to the spouse.
Consequently, a battered spouse may be deterred from taking
action to protect himself or herself, such as filing for a civil
protection order, filing criminal charges, or calling the police
because of the threat or fear of deportation.23
Each of these victims - Joanne, Jacques, and Marielle - might
have a private right of action if the batterer actually divulged the
personal information. All three victims might be able to sue for
invasion of privacy24 or intentional infliction of emotional distress.5
These actions, however, at best would bring the victim only monetary
damages and offer no relief from the central problem: the proverbial
cat is already out of the bag. Of course, no legal action could protect
her from the consequences of bias in a social context.
Further, although state employment law and the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act may protect people who are HIV
positive, coverage typically excludes most small employers such as
day care centers and individuals who employ domestic workers.26 At
present, there is no federal protection for employment retaliation on
the basis of sexual orientation.27 Moreover, the expense, futility, and
length of such suits render legal action of little solace.
Under the laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, a
victim of family violence can obtain a protection order if she can
prove that she has an intimate relationship with the perpetrator and
that the perpetrator committed an abusive act against her.28 Once a
23. Id.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See, e.g., Horman v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Ct. App. 1998) (laying out the
elements of a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress). The Supreme Court has
suggested, however, that the First Amendment may bar recovery where the speech is
truthful. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (denying recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress for truthful statements about a public figure).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 2001); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296[1][a] (Gould 2001).
27. The Non-Discrimination in Employment Act, H.R. 2355, which would have
offered employment protection to gays and lesbians, failed to pass the Senate in 1999.
28. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 (Michie 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31 (Anderson 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Harrison 2000); TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 81.001 (Vernon 1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (1995). See generally Catherine F.
Klein and Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis
of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993) (providing an overview of
state statutes authorizing domestic violence restraining orders); Developments in the Law
- Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1510, 1514-18, 1535-43
(1993).
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victim has proven these elements, she is entitled to relief intended to
protect her from violence and allow her to live independently from
the batterer. The forms of relief generally associated with protection
orders are "stay away" and no contact provisions - the perpetrator
must stay away from the victim's person and home and may not
contact her by phone or in writing. However, many state statutes
offer broad relief in addition to these basic provisions. Under D.C.
law, for example, the court is authorized to grant whatever relief is
"appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter."29 Thirty-nine
other jurisdictions offer a broad, catch-all provision under their civil
domestic violence laws." Under this statutory hook, advocates can
propose remedies designed to stop the violence and to allow the
victim to stay out of the battering relationship. The judge can
specifically tailor the injunction to circumstances. It is under such
provisions that victims like those illustrated above could obtain
effective court-ordered protection.
For example, these statutes implicitly authorize a court to direct
a perpetrator not to divulge certain information about the victim. In
order to protect Joanne, for example, the court could include a
provision that reads: "The Respondent shall not directly or indirectly
reveal any information about the Petitioner's health status to
Petitioner's employer or to any individuals associated with the Wilson
29. D.C. CODE ANN. 16-1005(c)(10) (1995).
30. ALA CODE § 30-5-7(c)(9) (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(16) (Michie
2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-3502(g)(6) (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-
205(a)(7)(A) (Michie 2001); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6322 (West 2001); COLO REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14-102 (15)(G) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)-15(b) (2001); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(11) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(k) (West 2001); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)(e) (Michie 2001); 750 ILL.
ADMIN. COMP. STAT. 60/214(17) (West 2001); IOWA CODE § 236.5(2) (2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(h) (Banks-Baldwin
2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.2135(A) (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209-A § 3
(2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 19-A § 4007; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 600.2950(1)(j)
(Michie 2001); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01.6.12 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §93-21-13 (2001);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 455.050 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(1)(g) (2001); NEV. REV.
STAT. 33.030 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-
5(A)(7) (Michie 2001); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842(i) (Gould 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50B-3(a)(13) (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(h) (Anderson 2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 60.4 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6108(a)(10) (West 2001); R.I. GEN LAWS § 15-15-3 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
4-60 (Law. Co-op 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5(6) (Michie 2001); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 85.022(a)(3) (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.2(2)(g) (2001); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(7) (Michie 2001);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060(1)(f) (2001); WYO STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(a)(vi) (Michie
2001).
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school with intent to cause emotional distress or harass the Petitioner,
except pursuant to subpoena or court order." Under D.C. law,
provisions such as this one have been granted in civil protection
orders.3
In most jurisdictions, protection orders are enforceable by
criminal contempt proceedings.32 As is the case where the batterer
violates a stay away provision, he would be accountable to the court
for non-compliance with a speech restriction. Violation of this order,
therefore, would potentially subject the perpetrator to a fine or jail
time, which increases the order's effectiveness.33
31. See, e.g., Carrasco v. Ruiz, IF 3206-97 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. Intrafamily
Branch, Dec. 19, 1997) (prohibiting Respondent from contacting any government agency
about Petitioner except pursuant to subpoena).
32. ALA. CODE § 30-5A-6; ALASKA STAT. §9.50.010(5) (Michie 1997); ARIz. REV.
STAT. § 13-3602(J) (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-134 (Michie 2001); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 166(c)(1) (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(7) (2001); DEL., CODE
ANN. Tit. 11, § 1271A(b) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.30(8)(a) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-
1077(1)(g) (2001); IDAHO STAT. §7-601(5) (Michie 2000); 750 ILL COMP. STAT. 60/223-6
(West 1998); IOWA CODE § 236.8 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (2001); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.760(1) (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137 (West 2001); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-508 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 19, § 4011 (2000); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(23) (2001); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(14)(f)-(g) (1997); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (1998); NV. ST. 8 DIST. CT. RULE. 5.22(g)(2)(2000); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §173-B:8(II) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-9 (West 2001); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-13-5(B) (Michie 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51(b) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50B-4(b) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2705.02 (Anderson 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.720(4) (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
6114 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(d) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(b) (2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-610(a) (2001); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.506 (Vernon 2000);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 1108(e) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.110(5) (1997); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-28-107 (Michie 2001).
33. One wonders, even if the court has authority to grant such a provision, would a
batterer be truly deterred from revealing this information by a simple civil court order? If
a victim were to leave a battering relationship based on what turned out to be the false
promise that a court order would protect the secrecy of this information, these orders may
actually prove detrimental to a victim. Such a provision would deprive the victim of the
opportunity to effectively conduct and rely on her own risk assessment. Reliance on an
exaggerated perception of the effectiveness of such a provision would dramatically distort
her assessment.
The effectiveness of a speech restriction is consistent with the effectiveness of any
protection order provision. Protection orders are most successful at deterring the
behavior of perpetrators who have committed low-level violence. ADELE HARRELL,
BARBARA SMITH & LISA NEWMARK, COURT PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS OF
RESTRAINING ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 50-57 (Urban Instit. 1993)
(analyzing the effectiveness of protection orders and suggesting that they are most
effective when the perpetrator has a minimal criminal history); Elizabeth Topliffe, Note,
Why Civil Protection Orders are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence But Mutual
Protective Orders are Not, 67 IND. L.J. 1039, 1046-1047 (1992) ("When issued and
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At first blush, the domestic violence speech restriction proposed
above may appear to offend the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment." Fearing reversal, a judge might initially refuse to issue
such an order that blatantly restricts speech in a seemingly content-
based fashion. However, as this Article demonstrates, the denial or
invalidation of such an injunction would depend on an unnecessarily
rigid interpretation of the First Amendment in light of the type of
speech involved and the state's interests in issuing the protection
order.
II. Content Based or Content Neutral?
In order to assess the constitutionality of the injunction, a court
would first determine the level of scrutiny appropriate to this speech
restriction by classifying the provision as content neutral or content
based. 5 Judicial categorization of speech restrictions between these
two categories can be highly outcome-determinative, since the
standard for determining the constitutionality of a content-based
enforced, civil protection orders appear to be effective against batterers who are not
extremely violent.") (citing P. FINN AND S. COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND
ENFORCEMENT 1 (1990)). See also Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An
Opportunity for Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 51,
54 (2000) (suggesting that studies finding mixed results for the effectiveness of protection
orders are misleading because the sample focused on abusers with a substantial criminal
history). See generally Susan L. Keilitz, Civil Protection Orders: A Viable Justice System
Tool for Deterring Domestic Violence, 9 VIOL. & VICTIMS 79 (1994) (stating that some
studies have found that protective orders can be effective at reducing domestic violence
and suggesting ways of improving their effectiveness). Further, studies show that civil
protection orders can be effective at reducing violence when the batterer is aware of the
existence of strong enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra
note 28 (arguing that effectiveness of protection orders relies on substantial monitoring,
enforcement efforts, and strict punishment for violations); Topliffe, supra at 1046-47
(stating that protection orders can be effective, but that the effectiveness depends on
statutory enforcement mechanisms and police cooperation). Vital elements of effective
protection orders are police cooperation with enforcement, community knowledge of such
cooperation, and criminal penalties for violations. Developments in the Law, supra note
28.
34. It is established that a court's issuance of an order of protection satisfies the state
action requirement and therefore implicates constitutional requirements. Clouterbuck v.
Clouterbuck, 556 A.2d 1082, 1085 n. 3 (D.C. 1989) ("There is no question that the
government's involvement in the issuance of a [protection order] rises to a level that
satisfies the state action requirement of the Due Process Clause.").
35. It would be misleading to suggest that courts systematically categorize based on
definitive principles. In fact, outcomes of categorization efforts are hardly consistent.
Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936, 946
(1987) (commenting on the inconsistency of Supreme Court analysis of speech
restrictions).
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speech restriction is much more exacting.
A. A domestic violence speech restriction would most likely survive
constitutional scrutiny if characterized as content neutral
If the court characterized this injunction as content neutral, it
would be far more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.36 For a
content-neutral restriction to be constitutionally sound, it simply
needs to serve a significant government interest and be narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. 7  For this reason, advocates and
commentators have attempted to characterize similar speech
restrictions as content neutral.38 However, because this argument
contorts First Amendment jurisprudence this Article will pause only
briefly to analyze the viability of this characterization.
Courts commonly classify restrictions regulating the time, place,
or manner of the speech as content neutral. 9 Several principles assist
courts in identifying such content-neutral restrictions. Two of these
principles may be relevant to the analysis:4" 1. The issuing government
actor had a purpose for adopting the restriction independent of the
content of the speech; or 2. The prohibition targets conduct rather
than speech and therefore implicates lesser First Amendment
36. See, e.g., Ambassador Books & Video v. Little Rock, 20 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1994)
(upholding a content-neutral city ordinance); Paulsen v. Gotbaum, 982 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.
1992) (upholding a city permitting regulation as a valid time, place, manner restriction).
37. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753,762 (1994).
38. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 369 (1997) (applying a less
exacting standard of review to an injunction because "it merely restricts the volume,
location, timing and harassing and intimidating nature of defendants' expressive speech.")
(quoting Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue Western N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1433
(W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
40. A third rationale used by the courts is the secondary effects doctrine that is
closely tied to the speech as conduct principle. Under the secondary effects doctrine, a
court may classify a speech restriction as content neutral because the "target of the
[restriction] is the secondary effect of... [the] conduct ... not its expressive content."
Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996),
cert. granted, 921 P.2d 602 (1996). The secondary effects doctrine, however, offers meager
assistance in an effort to characterize a domestic violence speech restriction as content
neutral. The secondary effect of the batterer's speech would be the victim's emotional
distress or loss of employment. In Boos v. Barry, the Supreme Court held that "emotive
impact of speech" is not a secondary effect that would transform a speech restriction into a
content-neutral prohibition. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). The California
Supreme Court disagreed with the California Court of Appeal's reliance on the secondary
effects doctrine in upholding the Avis injunction. Because the secondary effect of the
defendant's racist speech would amount to the emotional impact on the listener, the court
found the lower court's reliance untenable in light of Boos.
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concerns.
1. Neutral purpose without reference to content
In identifying content-neutral speech restrictions, the Supreme
Court inquires "whether the government has adopted a [restriction]
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. A
[restriction] that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on
some speakers' messages but not others., 4' In short, a restriction is
content neutral if it is "justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech. 4 2 For this inquiry, the government's purpose in
adopting the restriction is the "threshold consideration.
4
1
Recently, in Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court upheld a state
statute that created a "bubble zone" around people approaching
health care facilities. The statute precluded individuals from
breaching the bubble zone to distribute leaflets to, counsel, educate,
or otherwise protest those entering the health care facility. In order
to confirm that the state employed content-neutral justifications for
enacting the legislation, the Court looked to the legislative history of
the statute. The Court found that the statute was content neutral
because the state's interest in restricting the speech focused
exclusively on protecting access to health care, privacy, and on
providing the police with guidelines for enforcement."
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, the Court considered the
constitutionality of an injunction creating a "buffer zone" around
abortion clinic entrances and driveways. The district court had issued
the injunction after the protesters had blocked access to an abortion
clinic and harassed doctors at their homes, in defiance of an earlier
injunction.4 '6 Determining that the buffer zone injunction was content
neutral, the Court upheld the injunction against a constitutional
41. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citations omitted).
42. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000); Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1988); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron
v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (quoting Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
43. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763.
44. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20.
45. Id. The Supreme Court also found two other bases for concluding that the statute
was adopted without reference to content. However, the Court noted that each element
provided a sufficient independent basis for the Court's conclusion.
46. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759.
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challenge. 7 Again, the Court based its analysis on the state court's
intent in crafting the injunction. The Court determined the lower
court's intent was simply to protect those entering abortion clinics
from the conduct of those who had violated the court's original
order.48 The Court found the lower court's intent completely
unrelated to the protesters' message.
While the speech restrictions in both Hill and Madsen above de
facto restrict speech of those who espouse one viewpoint, the Court
considered this effect irrelevant to the content inquiry.49 The
Supreme Court maintained that the sole consideration under this
principle of First Amendment jurisprudence is the stated intent of the
restriction's drafters, not the effect the content-neutral injunction may
have on those whose speech is enjoined."
Superficially, a domestic violence speech restriction might appear
to be content neutral when assessed based on the issuing court's
intent. To be entitled to a protection order, the victim must prove
that the batterer has committed abusive acts toward her." To
illustrate her need for a speech restriction, the victim must provide
evidence that the batterer threatened to publicize personal
information about her if she left. Without the latter evidence, the
victim would not have proven that the relief is "necessary to the
effective resolution of the matter."52 At the close of evidence, a court
would have ample justification to restrain the batterer's speech about
specific issues related to the victim. Such an order would be
necessary to protect the victim from retaliation, harassment, and
invasion of privacy. These purposes are completely unrelated to the
suppression of ideas. If the court intended to suppress the content of
the speech without regard to the protection of the victim, the
injunction would read broadly to prohibit publication to any audience
of the personal facts at issue. Instead, the injunction would preclude
the batterer from publicizing the facts only in the ways that would
subject the victim to harassment and invasion of privacy.
47. Id. at 753.
48. Id. at 763.
49. Id.
50. Of course, the identification of legislative or judicial intent is fraught with
subjective interpretation. In practice, courts may identify a content-neutral justification
simply so that they may uphold the restriction.
51.. See supra note 28 for reference to various state statutes identifying the evidence a
victim must produce to be entitled a protection order.
52. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for the statutory cites and language that
authorizes a court to issue a speech restriction in the domestic violence context.
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However, although one might successfully argue that the issuing
court crafted the injunction entirely without reference to the content
or viewpoint of the speech to be enjoined, the injunction would still
explicitly forbid the discussion of specific topics. In contrast, neither
of the speech restrictions analyzed in Hill and Madsen targeted
specific topics." The injunction and statute proscribed speech in
specific locations delivered in a specific manner. 4 Therefore, in
addition to being adopted without reference to viewpoint and
content, both speech restrictions prohibited all speech delivered in a
specific manner in specific locations. Because it enjoins speech of a
specific content, a domestic violence speech restriction does not bear
the central characteristic of constitutionality that is endemic to time,
place, manner restrictions. Although not explicitly stated by the
courts, it is axiomatic that in order to satisfy the test for content
neutrality by looking to the state's purpose, an injunction would also
need to be silent as to the specific content of the restricted speech.
2. Content-neutral proscriptions on conduct
Courts characterize some restrictions on speech as content
neutral because the regulation or injunction primarily prohibits
conduct rather than speech. Although speech may get "swept up
incidentally within the reach of a'statute directed at conduct rather
than speech,"55 courts often find that such a restriction poses only a
minimal burden on speech. The Supreme Court articulated this
principle as follows: "It has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language .... ,,56
A typical illustration of this principle is harassment statutes.
53. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (determining the constitutionality of a
"bubble zone" around individuals entering health care facilities in which protesters cannot
distribute leaflets or offer counseling or advice); Madsen, v. Women's Health Center 512
U.S. 753 (analyzing an injunction creating a buffer zone around abortion clinic entrances
such that demonstrators could not protest or distribute their message). See also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (characterizing as content neutral a regulation
proscribing volume guidelines for outdoor concerts).
54. Hill, 530 U.S. 703; Madsen 512 U.S. 753..
55. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,389 (1992).
56. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
57. Stalking statutes also pass constitutional muster as content-neutral restrictions.
At least forty-eight states and the District of Columbia criminalize stalking. M. Katherine
Boychuck, Comment, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad? 88 Nw.
U. L. REV. 769, 769 n.1 (1994) (listing stalking laws in existence at time of publication). In
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Courts construe these statutes as criminalizing the act of speaking in a
harassing fashion. That the conduct is expressive does not transform
the statutes into content-driven speech restrictions. For example, the
Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a telephone harassment
statute because it "[c]learly ... regulates conduct, not mere speech.
What is proscribed is the making of a telephone call, with the
requisite intent and in the specified manner."58 Finding that verbal
harassment statutes are not directed at "the communication of
opinions or ideas, but at conduct," courts uniformly uphold these
statutes as valid proscriptions on speech. 9
Courts have also found that, under certain circumstances,
employment discrimination laws regulate conduct rather than speech
even when the proscribable behavior is verbal. The Supreme Court
in R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul intimated in dictum that certain words
may be constitutionally proscribable when they violate a statute
aimed at conduct.
[F]or example, sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among
other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment
practices. Where the government does not target conduct on
the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from
regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea
or philosophy.'
Since fighting words do not ever enjoy constitutional protection,
the Court's reference to them is unremarkable.6" However, the
Court's inclusion of the emphasized phrase, "among other words,"
suggests that the Court would permit enjoining otherwise protected
speech if that speech were to amount to discriminatory conduct.
The California Supreme Court recently upheld another
injunction based on content-neutral regulation of speech in Aguilar v.
nearly every stalking statute, stalking consists of some form of communication, whether it
is repeated verbal contact with the intent to harass or threats to do bodily harm. Yet the
majority of stalking statutes are upheld against First Amendment challenges. See United
States v. Smith, 685 A.2d 380, 383 n.7 (D.C. 1996) (listing stalking statutes and the
outcomes of their constitutional challenges).
58. Gormley v. Director, 632 F.2d 928, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1023 (1980).
59. Florida v. Elder, 382 So.2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1980); Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241,
243 (1988) ("We agree.., that [the harassment statute] prohibits conduct and not
protected speech.").
60. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389-90 (emphasis added).
61. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.62 The U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari review of the injunction. In Avis, the trial court found that
an Avis supervisor had harassed Latino employees by using racial
slurs and by leveling unfounded accusations at them on the job,
thereby violating the state anti-discrimination law. 63 The lower court
issued an injunction against Avis prohibiting its agents from using any
derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at or descriptive of
Hispanic or Latino employees.64 In concluding that the injunction was
constitutionally valid, the California Supreme Court relied upon its
observation that the injunction targeted the act of employment
discrimination.6 Discriminating against an individual on the job, the
court reasoned, is primarily conduct, whether or not accompanied by
speech.6
A court would be hard pressed to find that a domestic violence
speech restriction targets only conduct. Although, like harassment
statutes this injunction proscribes speech that amounts to harassment,
the proposed domestic violence speech restriction goes farther than
harassment statues by specifying the content of the barred harassing
communication. 6' Harassment laws are constitutional in part because
62. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1138 (2000).
63. Id. at 849.
64. Id. at 850 ("Defendant John Lawrence shall cease and desist from using any
derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at, or descriptive of, Hispanic/Latino
employees of Avis Rent A Car System, Inc .... as long as he is employed by Avis Rent A
Car System, Inc., in California."). The California Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the trial court to redraft the injunction to limit its application to the workplace. Id. The
Court of Appeals also directed the trial court to include an illustrative list of derogatory
epithets in order to provide the defendant with adequate notice of what constitutes
prohibited speech. Id.
65. Although the Avis Court hinted heavily that it upheld the injunction because it
regulated conduct and was narrowly tailored to meet an important state interest, the court
never explicitly stated the basis for its conclusion that the injunction is constitutionally
permissible. The Court seemed satisfied to cite to Supreme Court precedent holding that
the First Amendment permits the imposition of civil liability for speech amounting to
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 854-55.
66. Id. at 854.
67. The typical protection order directs the batterer not to harass the victim. See, e.g.,
PA. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(9) (West 2000) (permitting a court to enjoin harassment).
Protection orders including such provisions have withstood First Amendment challenges.
See Schramek v. Schramek, 429 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a
restraining order's no contact provision does not infringe on free speech because it is
directed not at speech but at the suppression of physical abuse). See generally, Klein &
Orloff, supra note 28, at 905-10 (reviewing decisions related to the constitutionality of
protection orders). However, this language would be too vague to proscribe harassment
consisting of divulging personal information about the victim.
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they are silent as to the actual content of the harassing speech. It is
too far a stretch, then, to assert that an injunction that prohibits the
discussion of certain topics enjoins only harassing conduct. An
additional complication arises because the privacy-invading speech at
issue does not constitute illegal behavior under any statute. 68 In both
the R.A.V. dictum and the Avis case, the courts noted that the speech
to be restrained violated a valid statute.69
An advocate might consider proposing an injunction that facially
enjoins conduct rather than content. For example, in analyzing the
Avis decision, Professor Charles Calleros propounds a theory that
injunctions issued in employment discrimination cases, if properly
drafted, should always regulate in a content-neutral fashion.'
Relying on R.A. V., Professor Calleros concludes that the government
"may selectively regulate less than an entire category of proscribable
speech if it does so on the basis of the 'conduct' of selectively
targeting victims rather than the content of the speech directed at the
victims."7 In order to illustrate his point, Professor Calleros proposes
an alternative formulation of the injunction issued in Avis, which
would assure its constitutionality.72
Although the injunction might identify the specifics of past
unlawful speech, it need not, and perhaps should not, enjoin only
certain words or views. It instead could enjoin the supervisor from
continuing to target Latino employees on the basis of their race or
national origin from unwelcome and distracting, humiliating, or
intimidating speech or conduct, if the speech or conduct could
substantially interfere with their work when viewed cumulatively. 3
In short, the re-conceived injunction would enjoin any expressive
conduct that, described broadly, would violate anti-discrimination
laws.
Although the R.A.V. dictum emboldened Professor Calleros to
assert that injunctions prohibiting certain types of harassing or
discriminatory speech might qualify as content neutral, R.A.V. offers
68. In some states, threats to divulge information may constitute blackmail, see infra
Part IIIB., but the actual utterance of the words would not necessarily violate any statute.
69. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1992); Avis, 980 P.2d at 854.
70. Charles Calleros, Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.: The California Supreme
Court Takes a Divided Freeway to Content-Oriented Regulation of Workplace Speech, 34
U.S.F. L. REV. 237,236-64 (2000).
71. Id. at 266.
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text to review the injunction upheld by the
Avis Court.
73. Calleros, supra note 70, at 292.
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little useful guidance to advocates seeking to craft a constitutionally
permissible domestic violence speech restriction. The contortions
that Professor Calleros performs to create an injunction that targets
conduct would result in an injunction that is overbroad and vague. A
domestic violence speech restriction following Professor Calleros'
formulation would read as follows: "The Respondent shall not conduct
himself in any way that shall humiliate, taunt, or antagonize the
Petitioner if the conduct is substantially likely to result in negative
repercussions for the Petitioner." This injunction prohibits the speech
the victim fears without any reference to content. However, it gives
no guidance to the batterer regarding what conduct is prohibited and
sweeps far more broadly than necessary. In trying to wrestle the
injunction into a content-neutral formulation, an advocate would
eviscerate its effectiveness and render it unconstitutional on
overbreadth grounds. Even definitional acrobatics fail to transform
this injunction into a content-neutral restriction.
B. This injunction likely would be characterized as a content-based
restriction subject to higher judicial scrutiny
Although advocates may be tempted to argue that a domestic
violence speech restriction is content neutral and therefore subject to
lower level scrutiny, First Amendment jurisprudence reveals that
most courts would construe the injunction as content based." Indeed,
the issuing court restricts the content of the batterer's message rather
than the manner or venue in which it is delivered. First year law
students often learn that courts apply a bright line test to each
74. Advocates who have argued on appeal in favor of domestic violence speech
restrictions have followed this path, asserting that the restriction is content neutral. From
an advocacy perspective, such an argument appears safer. If the court agreed that the
restriction was content neutral, it would be likely to uphold the injunction against a First
Amendment challenge. Arguing that a narrowly drawn injunction serves an important
state interest would not be challenged in most courts. Recognizing protection against
extortion, privacy, and freedom from harassment, a court may well identify an important
state interest is served by the injunction. The more challenging threshold argument,
however, that the injunction is content neutral, requires more argument than given by
advocates to date. Amicus Brief for Appellee at 27-28, Ruiz v. Carrasco, IF 3206-97 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Fam. Div. Intrafamily Branch, Dec. 19, 1997) (No. 98-FM-39 & 98-FM-40)
(2001) (arguing in two paragraphs that an injunction prohibiting the appellant from
contacting any government official about the appellee is content neutral because it targets
his conduct rather than the content and was adopted without regard to the message the
speech conveys); Brief for Appellee at 27, Ruiz v. Carrasco, IF 3206-97 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Fam. Div. Intrafamily Branch, Dec. 19, 1997) (Appeal No. 98-FM-39 & 98-FM-40) (2001)
(arguing in one paragraph that the injunction is content neutral because it was issued
under a content-neutral statute).
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content-based restriction to determine its viability. This itest
constitutes strict scrutiny analysis, which assesses whether the burden
on speech is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, whether
the injunction is narrowly tailored to meet that interest, and whether
alternative avenues for communication exist.75 In fact, the reality of
First Amendment jurisprudence is far murkier.76 Contemporary First
Amendment jurisprudence reflects a free form balancing77 of state
interests against speech. 78 Acknowledging the inevitability of judicial
75. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
76. The murky waters of First Amendment jurisprudence may be attributable, at least
in part, to the eternal debate over the central, unifying theory behind the Free Speech
Clause. Jurists and commentators have long debated and struggled with the rationale
informing First Amendment protection. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24
(1971) ("[The First Amendment] is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall
be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that
no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests."); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970) (examining the theoretical framework of the First Amendment);
Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
and the First Amendment. No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 506 (1995)
(identifying broad values espoused by the First Amendment including generally, the free
market place in ideas); Mary Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 22 (1990) ("The following justifications [for the First Amendment] are most
frequently offered: (1) speech enables citizens to make decisions required for self-
governance; (2) speech advances the search for truth; and (3) speech enhances self-
realization and the individual's potential for growth and advancement."); Richard
Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action Calling for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 175 (1982) (citing four other purposes behind
the First Amendment).
77. Although the author takes no position in the on-going debate about the
normative value of balancing, she asserts that Supreme Court jurisprudence is testimony
to its existence. For commentary on balancing, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Shielding Children and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 141 (1997); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987); Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30
UCLA L. REV. 671 (1983).
78. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-54 (1983) (balancing the right of public
employees to speak on matters of public concern against the state interest in governance);
Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1975)
(chronicling the development of the doctrine protecting free speech in the context of
commercial information and stressing that the nature of the speech affects the analysis);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Will County, 391 U.S. 563, 570 n.3 (1968) (stating that there
are no absolutes in the area of speech in government employment because "it is possible
to conceive of some positions in public employment in which the need for confidentiality is
so great that even completely correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground
for dismissal."); Scheetz v. Morning Call, 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("Before
this court can balance these rights, it notes that balancing is legitimate. Time and time
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balancing, Justice Harlan wrote "[w]henever... [First Amendment]
protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental
powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires
an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved."79
Typically, content-based restrictions that withstand this scrutiny
fall into one of the categories that the courts have segregated from
the protective reach of the First Amendment, such as fighting words,'
defamation,81  obscenity,82  and advocacy of imminent lawless
behavior. 3 However, content-based restrictions that do not fall into
one of these categories are not per se invalid. Instead, after
balancing, a court may find that the restriction fits into what the
Supreme Court refers to as "a more general exception for content
discrimination that does not threaten the censorship of ideas. '
A court facing a constitutional challenge to a domestic violence
speech restriction would have no direct precedent to which to turn.
Although at least one court has granted such a restriction, none has
again, the Court, though reasserting that the rights protected by the First Amendment are
fundamental, has made clear that any restriction on speech - even a prior restraint -
may be permissible if sufficiently compelling reasons warrant it.") (citations omitted);
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 38 (Cal. 1971) (suggesting that the court
undertakes free form balancing on an ad hoc basis by indicating that some speech is more
deserving of protection than others, even within the realm of the press). See also Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search for "Central
Meaning" of the First Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1616-17 (2000) ("The Supreme
Court's rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, much contemporary First Amendment
caselaw reflects direct cost/benefit analysis of proposed speech activity."); Aleinikoff,
supra note 77, at 943 (stating that balancing in constitutional reasoning is widespread);
Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936 (1987)
(asserting that courts routinely balance First Amendment rights against state interests to
one degree or another); Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (1976) (stating that First Amendment protections are fluid
such that efforts at classifying certain speech as within or outside the ambit of
constitutional protection is impossible); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CAL. L. REV. 935, 941 (1968) (highlighting the prevalence of balancing in First
Amendment jurisprudence, analyzing its ad hoc nature, and concluding "I do not know
how to avoid the logical conclusion from this that there is no constitutional guarantee to
freedom of expression."). But cf Volokh, supra note 77, at 167-68 (arguing that balancing
is a tautological answer to the problem of comparing intangibles).
79. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
80. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
81. Id.; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952).
82. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
83. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
84. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,393 (1992).
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resulted in an appellate decision.85 Because privacy-invading speech
in a domestic violence context does not fall into one of the
predetermined categories of unprotected speech, the court would
therefore engage in balancing, weighing the value of the speech
against the countervailing interests to be protected by the injunction.
III. In the Balance: The Value of Speech
When a statute or injunction restricts speech that has no First
Amendment value a court assessing the constitutionality of the
restriction need not conduct a balancing test. Although the
restriction might be struck on vagueness grounds, it does not
unconstitutionally infringe on free speech. Therefore, any analysis of
the constitutionality of a domestic violence speech restriction should
begin with an examination of the speech itself; for if it is not protected
speech, any injunction would stand, regardless of the interests
involved. In reality, the constitutional assessment of speech is rarely
a zero sum game. Only speech that falls into one of the unprotected
classifications is categorically accorded no First Amendment
protection. Most other speech falls somewhere along a continuum
between protected and unprotected expression.86 Its placement along
that continuum indicates the weight a court allocates to the speech
when balancing it against state interests in restraining the speech.
A. Importance of context
The context of the speech is vital to determining its place along
the continuum" - its level of constitutional protection. Of course,
85. Carrasco v. Ruiz, IF 3206-97 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. Intrafamily Branch, Dec.
19, 1997).
86. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Our First Amendment
decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core
political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; commercial speech and
nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class expression;
obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all."); Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985) ("This Court on many occasions
has recognized that certain kinds of speech are less central to the interests of the First
Amendment than others .... ).
87. The relationship between the speech and the intent of the First Amendment can
also influence the value a court ascribes to speech. Sometimes particular expression will
be accorded little or no First Amendment protection because it does not serve these goals.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court noted that they have sanctioned
exceptions to First Amendment protection where the speech constitutes "no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any
benefit that may be derived from it [is] clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In United States
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time, place, manner doctrine illustrates the importance of context,
since it is commonly accepted that a state may regulate speech more
freely if the restriction is based on the venue of the communication or
the way in which it is delivered.89  Justice Holmes' famous
hypothetical in U.S. v. Schenck further illustrates the influence of
venue: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. '
In Schenck, the Supreme Court illustrated the importance of
contextual intangibles in ascribing constitutional value to speech. The
Court considered whether a document produced by the Socialist
party urging draft obstruction exposed its authors to prosecution
under the Espionage Act of 1917. The Court determined that the
First Amendment did not insulate the defendants from prosecution
because the speech enjoyed no constitutional protection. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court took heavily into consideration that the
country was at war. "We admit that in many places and in ordinary
times the defendants in saying all that was in the circular, would have
been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act
v. Valasquez, the Seventh Circuit upheld a statute criminalizing threats to retaliate against
a government witness because "[a] threat to break a person's knees or pulverize his
automobile as punishment for his having given information to the government is a
statement of intention rather than an idea or opinion and is not part of the marketplace of
ideas." United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1357 (7th Cir. 1985). While a particular
utterance may not be diametrically opposed to speech serving First Amendment goals, a
court may accord it lesser First Amendment value because of its attenuated connection to
the furtherance of those goals. As one California court explained, "as speech strays
farther from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free exchange of ideas ... the state has
greater latitude to regulate the expression." People v. Borrelli, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851, 859
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991)).
However, because the goals of the First Amendment are a topic of perennial scholarly and
jurisprudential debate, it is futile to conduct a reliable assessment of the value of speech
based on this principle. See supra note 76 for more discussion of the goals of the First
Amendment.
88. Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace?
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Work Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399,
420 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of context in First Amendment jurisprudence and
highlighting its impact on the degree of protection the speech is accorded). See, e.g.,
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 426-7 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The meaning and the
legitimacy of its regulation can only be determined in context."); Id. at 429 (Stevens, J.
concurring) ("[T]he scope of protection provided expressive activity depends in part upon
its content and character."); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) ("[W]hether a
specific act of communication is protected by the First Amendment always requires some
consideration of both its content and its context.").
89. See supra Part 11A.
90. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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depends upon the circumstances in which it is done."91
The Supreme Court's decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies presents a fairly dramatic illustration of the
importance of context to First Amendment analysis.92 In Milk
Wagon, the Court reviewed an order enjoining protesters from
picketing a dairy. While the Court acknowledged that the First
Amendment ordinarily protects protesting, it upheld the injunction
based on the defendants' prior conduct. The record revealed that
multiple incidents of violence had accompanied the defendants' prior
protests, including beatings, window smashing, and looting.93 Because
of the violent background of the protesting, the Court found that
even peaceful protesting had acquired a coercive taint. The Court
concluded that "acts which in isolation are peaceful may be part of a
coercive thrust when entangled with acts of violence." 94 The Court
held that the First Amendment would not protect such expression
simply because protesting constituted speech. Instead, the Court
stressed the importance of a more nuanced consideration of context
to assess the value of speech: "[U]tterance in a context of violence can
lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an
instrument of force."95
What is the value of speech divulging private information in a
domestic violence context? Under the modern interpretation of
fighting words, a court could not conclude that the speech falls into
this narrow category of unprotected speech. When first articulated by
the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the definition of
fighting words was extremely broad, covering words "which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace."96 Such a broad definition would permit the regulation of
nearly any offensive speech. The Court recognized the definition's
overbreadth, however, and narrowed its reach to include only face-to-
91. Id. at 52.
92. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Diaries, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) ("Freedom of expression can be
suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an
inseparable part of it."); Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)
("Conduct which alone would constitute protected activities may be actionable if it is part
of a common plan that includes activity that is clearly unprotected.").
93. Milk Wagon, 312 U.S. at 291-92.
94. Id. at 294.
95. Id. at 293.
96. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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face encounters that are likely to provoke immediate violence.97
Addressed to a third party and unlikely to provoke imminent
violence, speech divulging personal information about a battered
partner does not implicate the fighting words exception.9"
In an effort to ascribe a relative constitutional value to privacy-
invading domestic violence speech, one must look to the context in
which the words would be uttered. These words would be spoken
after the victim has left the violent relationship. Having failed to
coerce the victim to stay in the intimate relationship, the batterer
would inform an employer about the victim's HIV status, for
example, to retaliate against the victim for her departure. The
absence of a political or otherwise socially justified motive would be
illustrated by his prior coercive threats to divulge the information and
by his failure to circulate the information when the victim remained
in the relationship. An Oklahoma court stated that the Constitution
was never intended generally to protect speech in the context of
domestic violence: "We [] reject any notion that the First
Amendment ... ever covered threatening or abusive communications
to persons who have demonstrated a need for protection from an
immediate and present danger of domestic abuse."99  Under this
general analysis, the constitutional value of privacy-invading domestic
violence speech is low and would not appear to weigh heavily in the
balance against countervailing interests.
B. Protection of analogous extortionate speech
Extortionate °° speech provides a useful analog to privacy-
invading speech in a domestic violence context. Because the speech is
97. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
98. Despite the Cohen Court's significant narrowing of the doctrine, Professor
Charles Lawrence presents a powerful argument that racist speech could be characterized
as fighting words because face-to-face racist speech is the functional equivalent of fighting
words as defined by the Cohen Court. According to Professor Lawrence, the Cohen Court
envisioned fighting words exchanged between people of equal bargaining power who were
empowered to retaliate. See Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990).
99. Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
100. I will interchangeably use the terms blackmail and extortion to refer to this type
of behavior. Although historically courts and legislatures may have drawn some
distinction between the two conducts, that distinction has become nebulous. James
Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 673 (1984)
("The terms blackmail and extortion are often used interchangeably."). See also
Greenspun v. Gandolfo, 320 P.2d 628, 630 (Nev. 1958) ("Though the word 'blackmail' may
not be a word of art, it is a word of common parlance and popular usage, often defined as
synonymous with extortion.").
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of a similar nature, the court's assessment of the value of extortionate
speech suggests the corresponding significance to be ascribed to
domestic violence speech. Blackmail generally refers to the use of
threats to gain an advantage by inducing someone to do or refrain
from doing something they have a legal right to freely do or not do.
Blackmail statutes criminalize speech intended not to communicate
any expressive content, but only to attain personal gain. Similarly,
the batterer utters privacy-invading words not with the intent to
benignly communicate ideas, but to achieve personal vindication.
Often, blackmail statutes criminalize threats to commit what would
otherwise be legal actions outside the context of the threat."' In the
same way, the domestic violence speech restriction enjoins speech
that might otherwise be protected if uttered outside the context of a
domestic violence relationship. Moreover, the privacy-invading
speech garners a coercive patina similar to extortionate speech
because the batterer used the threat of it previously to gain control
over the victim. Identifying the unifying elements of blackmail
statutes both struck and upheld suggests the parameters necessary to
constitutionally enjoin speech of minimal constitutional value through
a domestic violence speech restriction. 2
Blackmail statutes constitute part of the familiar fabric of our
criminal law.' 3 While these statutes vary greatly in breadth and
scope, " they share one uniform characteristic. They criminalize
101. See, e.g. FLA. STAT. § 836.05 (2000) and discussion infra Part III.B.
102. Many commentators have struggled with the inconsistent body of precedent to
determine the circumstances under which and the reasons why extortionate speech may be
criminalized. See Lindren supra note 100, at 671 ("Possible rationales for blackmail have
been presented by some of the leading scholars of this century, including Arthur
Goodhart, Robert Nozick, Lawrence Friedman, Richard Posner, and Richard Epstein.
None, however, has successfully explained the crime."). See also State v. Robertson, 649
P.2d 569, 587 (Or. 1982) ("In sum, our review of the cases that have tested laws against
extortion, intimidation, or coercion under the First Amendment yields no principled
guidance on freedom of expression to state verbal demands coupled with verbal threats.").
103. In addition, a small minority of states recognize a common law tort suit for
extortion. See, e.g., Zohn v. Menard, Inc., 598 N.W. 2d 323, 329-30 (Iowa 1999) (stating
that Iowa recognizes a civil cause of action for violation of the criminal extortion statute);
Furhman v. Cal. Satellite Sys., 786 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1990) (affirming that California permits
civil suits for monetary damages on the basis of extortion).
104. Some statutes criminalize only threats made in order to gain a pecuniary
advantage. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 25 (Law. Co-op. 2001); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2905.11 (Anderson 2001); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3923 (West 2001);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-59 (Michie 2001). Other statutes proscribe a broader array of
threats, made with a variety of intents, to accuse a person of a crime, expose a secret, or
impair an individual's reputation in any way. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 876 (2001); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN § 14:66 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ch.836.05 (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3852
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speech. Although courts do not characterize extortionate speech as a
preestablished category of speech that the state may freely enjoin,
such as fighting words, blackmail statutes are commonly assumed to
pass constitutional muster. Although some statutes have been struck
as overbroad, some of the most broad statutes have survived First
Amendment challenges.
Federal caselaw reveals a general assumption that extortionate
speech is within the states' power to prohibit. When commenting on
the constitutionality of blackmail statutes, federal courts broadly
confirm their validity. The Fifth Circuit held: "It may categorically be
stated that extortionate speech has no more constitutional protection
than that uttered by a robber while ordering his victim to hand over
the money, which is no protection at all.""0 5  Analyzing the
constitutionality of a government secrecy agreement, the Fourth
Circuit emphasized that "[t]hreats and bribes are not protected
simply because they are written or spoken; extortion is a crime
although it is verbal."' 0
When courts undertake a more exacting analysis of the
constitutionality of blackmail statutes, they generally uphold the
statute when it is narrowly drawn and prohibits extortionate behavior
carried out with a specific malicious intent. Some statutes are upheld
in the absence of an intent requirement if the statute proscribes only
threats to commit unlawful acts. In those statutes, the unlawful
conduct requirement allows the court to infer wrongful intent.
To illustrate a statute that was upheld because it satisfied these
elements, we look to the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the federal
extortion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 876.07 The statute provides:
Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or
other thing of value, knowingly so deposits [in the postal
service] any communication... addressed to any other person
and containing any threat to injure the property of another or
reputation of the addressee or of another.., shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.'O
(1999).
105. United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 1975).
106. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1314 (4th Cir. 1972). See also United
States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding a retaliation statute that
punished speech by holding that threats to punish another for his having given testimony
to the government is a statement of intention rather than an idea or opinion and is
therefore not protected speech)..
107. United States v. Hutson, 843 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1988).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 876 (2001).
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This statute prohibits a range of threats including threats to take
actions that are, in themselves, legal. On the face of this statute, for
example, it would be criminal for a man to send a letter to an intimate
partner threatening to disseminate damaging personal information
about her unless she remained in a relationship with him. In United
States v. Hutson, the court found that the statute survived an
overbreadth challenge because the statute specifically detailed the
prohibited conduct and because its intent requirement ensured that it
would not chill political speech. "The 'intent to extort' requirement
of section 876 guarantees that the statute reaches only extortionate
speech, which is undoubtedly within the government's power to
prohibit.""'° In the court's view, the intent to extort transformed even
threats to commit otherwise legal acts into criminal behavior.
State court blackmail jurisprudence is consistent with the Hutson
decision. The Florida Supreme Court upheld a blackmail statute in
Carricarte v. State."0  The Florida statute at issue criminalized
utterances which "constitute malicious threats to do injury to
another's person, reputation or property... with the intent to extort
money or the intent to compel another to act or refrain from acting
against his will.".1  The court held that the statute's proscription on
threats to commit legal actions was not fatal to its constitutionality
because the statute required malicious intent."2
Finally, a Virginia appeals court upheld the state's blackmail
statute that prohibited threats to commit legal or illegal acts with
intent to extort any pecuniary benefit."3 The court found that the
statute did not infringe unconstitutionally on speech because it
prohibited only speech to accrue pecuniary gain." ' As such, the
statute contained an implicit intent requirement, requiring threats to
be committed with an extortionate intent. This requirement
prevented the statute from sweeping too broadly and proscribing
protected speech.
In recent years, courts have invalidated several state blackmail
statutes on the grounds of overbreadth."5 Each invalidated statute
109. Hutson, 843 F.2d at 1235.
110. Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 1980).
111. Id. at 1263.
112. Id.
113. Stein v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 238,239 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
114. Id. at 241-42.
115. See, e.g., State v. Weinstein, 898 P.2d 513, 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Whimbush v.
People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Colo. 1994); Seattle v. Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wash. Ct.
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prohibited a wide range of conduct. For example, the Oregon
coercion" ' statute criminalized threats to take a broad array of actions
in order to compel another to engage in or refrain from engaging in
certain conduct.' None of the statutes conditioned criminality on a
finding of intent . The courts found that a broad spectrum of
behaviors would be unconstitutionally prohibited under the statutes.
For example, the statutes facially prohibited a mother from informing
her former husband that if he did not pay child support, she would
report him to the court;"9 prohibited a union from threatening to take
collective action if its members did not receive higher wages;'20
prohibited a prosecutor from offering a plea bargain in certain
circumstances; 2' and criminalized speech commonly acceptable in
journalism, law enforcement, and academia.
Although each state suggested that the courts engraft an intent
App. 1993); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (Or. 1982).
116. Some states criminalize blackmail through more modern statutes referring to
intimidation or coercion. See Lindgren, supra note 100, at 673 (defining the terms used in
the regulation of extortionate behavior).
117. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275 (1999) provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of coercion when the person compels or induces another
person to engage in conduct from which the other person has a legal right to abstain, or to
abstain from engaging in conduct in which the other person has a legal right to engage, by
means of instilling in him a fear that, if the other person refrains from the conduct
compelled or induced or engages in conduct contrary to the compulsion or inducement the
actor or another will:
a. Unlawfully cause physical injury to the other person; or
b. Unlawfully cause damage to property; or
c. Unlawfully engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
d. Falsely accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against
the person; or
e. Cause or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some person's
business, except that such a threat shall not be deemed coercive when the act or omission
compelled is for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or
f. Testify falsely or provide false information or withhold testimony or information with
respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
g. Unlawfully use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within
or related to official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such
manner as to affect some person adversely.
(2) Coercion is a Class C felony.
118. Weinstein, 898 P.2d at 515; Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248; Ivan, 856 P.2d at 1120;
Robertson, 649 P.2d at 578.
119. Weinstein, 898 P.2d at 515.
120. Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248, 1251.
121. Ivan, 856 P.2d at 1120.
122. Robertson, 649 P.2d at 589.
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requirement to save the statutes from constitutional infirmity, each
court found that a wrongful intent element would not rectify the
constitutional overbreadth"' According to the Supreme Court of
Colorado, "a specific intent requirement does not eliminate
overbreadth concerns when the effect associated with the intent
provision (in this case, to induce another to act against his or her will)
encompasses a substantial amount of protected activity. 124
Does this mean that intent is also irrelevant to the
constitutionality of a narrowly drawn blackmail statute? Not
necessarily. Where the courts have denigrated the ameliorative
constitutional effect of an intent requirement, the statute at issue has
been vastly overbroad, facially criminalizing immense quantities of
political and social speech. Narrowly tailored statutes, such as the
federal and Florida laws, which include intent requirements and
criminalize the threats of even lawful activities have successfully
survived constitutional analysis.
A domestic violence speech restriction would closely resemble
the affirmed blackmail statutes. Like the federal, Florida, and
Virginia statutes, the domestic violence speech restriction would
sweep very narrowly, enjoining minimal speech. A domestic violence
speech restriction, like the federal and Florida statutes, would
proscribe what is ordinarily legal speech, but when coupled with
malicious intent becomes unprotected speech.
The domestic violence speech restriction suggested in Part I
incorporates an explicit intent requirement. It specifies that the
Respondent not divulge certain private information with the intent to
harass or to cause emotional distress to the Petitioner.' Such a
requirement would assure that only maliciously motivated speech
would be enjoined. A batterer's discussion of the victim's HIV status
with his doctor, for example, would not be actionable because it
would not be uttered with the intent to cause the victim emotional
distress.
An intent requirement, however, would present a challenge to
enforcement. It would require that victims prove intent beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to prevail in a contempt action against the
batterer. Because most domestic violence victims enter the legal
system unrepresented,'26 this burden would be particularly onerous
123. Weinstein, 898 P.2d at 517; Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248; Ivan, 856 P.2d at 1122.
124. Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248.
125. See supra Part I.
126. For example, approximately 70% of individuals petitioning for protection orders
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and would significantly diminish the enforceability of the prohibition.
However, such an intent requirement would not completely
eviscerate the provision. The mere existence of a court order would
deter the batterer from divulging the information. In fact, although
courts may question the effectiveness of protection orders in
eradicating abusive behavior, judges acknowledge their role in
deterring abuse.1 27 Further, advocates or victims would be able to
make a strong case to prove intent in cases where the judge admits
evidence of past threats to reveal the information.
The state's interest in prohibiting extortionate speech is also
relevant to First Amendment analysis of blackmail statutes. In
Carricarte, the Florida Supreme Court suggested that the strength of
the state's interest in protecting against blackmail confirmed the
statute's constitutionality: "The state's interest in shielding its citizens
from these types of strong-arm tactics can only be designated as
compelling. To hold otherwise would transform the First
Amendment into an instrument of leverage for the influential.'
128
The same interest is at stake in the domestic violence context.
Every individual, of course, is legally entitled to leave a romantic
relationship. The victims outlined in the introduction, however, are
subject to "strong arm tactics"'29 because their abusers happen to
know personal information about them. Because of the potentially
dire consequences resulting from the circulation of this information,
the victim may choose not to exercise her legal right to leave the
relationship. She will not have any protection from his threats if she
does not concede to his will. Courts have an interest in intervening
where the batterer has used unfair leverage and coercion to keep the
victim in the battering relationship. In fact, the state's interest in
protecting a victim in need of a domestic violence speech injunction is
in the District of Columbia are unrepresented. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, at 143 (1992).
127. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 43 (D.C. 1993) ("A [restraining
order], of course, does not guarantee protection... [r]ather its existence serves as a
potential deterrent and provides a measure of peace of mind for those whose benefit it
was issued."). Cf. Ronald B. Adrine & Alexandria M. Ruden, Court Enforcement of Civil
Protection Orders and Related Issues, in OHIO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW ch. 12 (2000)
(stating that the threat of court enforcement of the protective order in the form of
contempt provides a deterrent to future abuse).
128. Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 1980). See also City of Seattle v.
Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (suggesting that there might be a
compelling state interest in protecting citizens from extortionate threats).
129. Carricarte. 384 So. 2d at 1263.
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even greater than its interest in protecting the average victim of
blackmail. Where the average blackmail victim must pay money to
avoid injury to reputation, this victim is forced to sacrifice her bodily
integrity. She must endure living with an individual who physically
assaults her. To guard against the success of batterer's tactics, the
court has no recourse other than to restrain this limited category of
speech.
Although the context of the speech at issue in a domestic
violence speech restriction and its analogous nature to unprotected
extortionate speech suggest that the speech may be accorded low
value by the court, the analysis does not guarantee that the speech is
unprotected. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the state interests
to be protected by enjoining the speech. These interests must be
weighed against the value of the speech to determine the viability of
the injunction.
IV. In the Balance: Interests at Stake
When threatening to divulge private information about the
victim, the batterer triggers several state interests. In cases where the
victim has sought to retain the secrecy of this information for fear of
employment or social repercussions, this dissemination is a severe
assault to her privacy. The publication poses a separate threat to the
victim's children. People might taunt or ostracize the children based
on their parent's sexual orientation or HIV status. Moreover, the
state has an interest in protecting individuals from domestic violence.
That interest is profoundly implicated by a batterer's extortionate
efforts to keep the victim in a violent relationship. Court doctrine
regarding the propriety of speech restrictions in a family context is
therefore relevant to the constitutional analysis.
A. The state's interest in privacy
In privacy suits, an individual may be liable for disclosing private
facts to others3 ' in a way that would be highly offensive to a
130. While many jurisdictions require publication to more than one person in order
prevail in this suit, the dissemination of certain information by an abusive spouse to
certain audiences may be actionable in certain jurisdictions. However, because restitution
may be of little solace to a domestic violence victim who has just lost her job because her
employer has discovered that she is HIV positive, ex post remedies are relatively useless to
the class of victims at issue here. Ironically, as one commentator pointed out "though
injury often flows from widespread publication of disclosed information, the greatest
injury may well [sic] be caused by disclosure to a single person, such as an employer or a
spouse." Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
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reasonable person. A disclosure of personal information invades two
interests that the state seeks to protect through the common law: (1)
An interest in the security of personal, confidential information about
which the individual has an expectation of privacy; and (2) An
interest in protecting the wronged individual from the repercussions
of the circulation."' Although these actions impose liability for
content-based disclosures, and although privacy-invading speech is
not one of the exclusions from protection of the First Amendment,
courts routinely impose liability when the protection of these interests
outweigh the defendant's speech rights.
Invasion of privacy suits pit two powerful American ideals
against each other, requiring the courts to examine each alleged
invasion on a case-by-case basis132 to determine which interest trumps
the other.' As the California Supreme Court explained: "the right to
know and the right to have others not know are, simplistically
considered, irreconcilable."3 4 However, privacy suits routinely force
courts to reconcile these interests.
Generally, as a value central to the American ideals of autonomy
and self-definition, privacy is accorded significant respect by the
judiciary. In a case challenging an invasion of privacy suit on First
Amendment grounds, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]e note that
privacy is not only a personal interest, but is also one of concern to
society as a whole.... In our view, fairly defined areas of privacy
must have the protection of law if the quality of life is to continue to
be reasonably acceptable."'35 The D.C. Court of Appeals, in affirming
the constitutionality of tort actions for invasion of privacy, held that
1426, 1435 (1982). See also discussion supra Part I.
131. Vickery, supra note 130, at 1434-35 (identifying the interests at stake in a breach
of professional confidence).
132. The Court has thus far declined to announce a per se rule regarding privacy as it
has in the case of defamation which would obviate the need for this grueling process. Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (declining to decide whether "the
State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the
press."). See also Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 822 F.2d 747, 758 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether tort liability for truthful publication of private
matters unrelated to public affairs is constitutionally permissible.").
133. This challenging reconciliation has spawned a great deal of scholarly commentary.
See, e.g. Willard Pedrick, Publicity and Privacy: Is It Any of Our Business?, 20 U. TOR.
L.J. 391 (1970) (analyzing privacy law and media free speech rights); Edward Bloustein,
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and
Unconstitutional As Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611 (1968) (wrestling to reconcile several
theories of privacy with theories of freedom of speech).
134. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971).
135. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
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the action "represents a vindication of the right of private personality
and emotional security, the essence of the interest protected being
aptly summarized [as] . . . 'the right to be let alone.""36 In fact, the
D.C. Circuit held in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson that privacy is
considered to be a compelling state interest, which can be so powerful
that it might even overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality of
prior restraints. "7
A court facing a First Amendment challenge to a privacy suit
weighs privacy against the speech, assessing the value of the speech
by reference to the public concern standard."' Speech on matters of
public concern holds an elevated status in the hierarchy of privacy-
invading speech.139
The public concern standard protects the dissemination of
information to which the public has a right of access. Salacious gossip
falls outside the parameters of public concern. The Second
Restatement of Torts articulates this standard as follows:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest,
account must be taken of the customs and conventions of the
community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a
matter of the community mores. The lines to be drawn when
the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the
public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying
into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable
member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he
has no concern.
When courts balance speech against privacy, privacy most often
prevails when the speaker is an individual not associated with the
press.141 The involvement of the press transforms the individual right
136. Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(citation omitted).
137. 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
138. Gallela v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("It might be argued
that the Court should not place itself in the position of drawing lines and of weighing the
value of various communications so as to deny to some of them, under certain
circumstances, the protection of the First Amendment. But that is what courts are for ....
Not only is such an undertaking by the courts a familiar task, but it is essential to the
reconciliation of these two basic rights - privacy and freedom of speech.") (citations
omitted).
139. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) ("[T]he Court has frequently
reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values' and is entitled to special protection.") (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982))
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. h. (1977).
141. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1974) (holding that the
First Amendment barred the imposition of civil liability on a television company for
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to free speech into a community right of access to information.42 An
invasion of privacy by the media must reach an intolerable level
before the courts will enjoin the publication. 43
Even the media's free speech rights, however, sometimes
surrender to privacy in the context of an invasion of privacy suit. In
Virgil v. Time, the Ninth Circuit suggested that a publishing house
may be held liable for invasion of privacy."' When researching an
article on surfing, a journalist interviewed a body surfer who revealed
not only his surfing escapades, but also some additional "rather
bizarre incidents in his life that were not directly related to surfing.'
' 45
After the interviews, but before publication, the surfer requested that
the stories unrelated to surfing be redacted from the article.46
Contrary to his request, the article, including all revelations, ran in
Sports Illustrated. 147 The surfer brought an invasion of privacy action.
When the trial court denied the magazine's motion for summary
judgment, the magazine appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Although it
remanded the case, the Ninth Circuit determined that the article
could have tortiously invaded the surfer's privacy."4 As to the First
Amendment concerns, the court found that the surfer's right to
privacy could outweigh the value of the speech, defined by the
public's right to know private facts about his life. 149 "The public's
right to know is... subject to reasonable limitations so far as
concerns the private facts of its individual members."'50  This case
illustrates that even in the case of the media, freedom of speech can
be defeated by an individual's interest in privacy - even after the
individual has voluntarily shared the information with the defendant.
The courts should assess an individual speaking about the private
broadcasting the name of a rape victim); Afro-American Publishing Co., 366 F.2d at 649
(holding that an invasion of privacy suit was barred by the First Amendment where a
newspaper publisher circulated a photograph and article recounting plaintiff's comments
that the newspaper was breeding interracial mistrust and tension).
142. Afro-American Publishing Co., 366 F.2d at 654 (stating that in balancing privacy
against freedom of the press "the courts are called upon.., to harmonize individual rights
and community interests.").
143. State v. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1981).
144. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
145. Id. at 1124.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1127.
149. Id. at 1128.
150. Id.
Fall 2001]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
life of another with more leniency. Because such cases do not
implicate freedom of the press, courts need consider only the value of
the speech to the speaker. It is the individual speaker with whom we
are most concerned for the purposes of analogizing to domestic
violence speech restrictions. In two relevant cases, courts found that
the right to privacy outweighed the speaker's right to freely
disseminate the confidential details of another's life. In Doe v. Roe, a
psychiatrist attempted to distribute a book that contained verbatim
disclosures by a patient. 5' The patient confided these thoughts during
therapy sessions.152 The court upheld the lower court's decision in
favor of the plaintiff-patient, finding that the disclosure invaded the
patient's right to privacy.'53 Significantly, the court found that the
plaintiff enjoyed a right to privacy that was "contractual and
otherwise, '. clarifying that a protectible interest in privacy exists
independently of any formal relationship between the parties.
Another doctor was found liable of invasion of privacy in
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's'5 The D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the
judgment that the defendant doctor had invaded his patient's privacy
when he published photographs of the patient before and after plastic
surgery.'56 The doctor distributed the photographs without the
patient's consent to advertise his services.' The court's holding
rested on the observation that the right to privacy "'stands on high
grounds, cognate to the values and concerns protected by
constitutional guarantees."'" 8 The court used the public concern
standard to scrutinize the particular speech at issue to determine its
value. "'59 When the court balanced the interest in privacy against the
public's right to the information at issue, it found the plaintiff "had a
higher interest to be protected."'
While some state courts have considered invasion of privacy suits
by one individual against another, the Supreme Court has avoided
151. Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1977).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 678.
154. Id.
155. 492 A.2d 580, 589 (D.C. 1985).
156. Id. at 595.
157. Id. at 584.
158. Id. at 589 (quoting Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1966)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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addressing the constitutionality of enjoining truthful statements by
non-media actors about private individuals."' The Court, however,
has stated in dicta that lesser First Amendment concerns are raised
when statements regard private individuals and are unrelated to
public concerns."'
How is this analysis relevant to the constitutionality of a
domestic violence speech restriction? If a court identified the victim's
privacy as the interest at stake, the court's analysis would be
161. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) ("In... Time, Inc.
v. Hill, [we] expressly saved the question whether truthful publication of very private
matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally proscribed.") (citing Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383, n.7 (1967)); Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 822 F.2d 747,
758 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether tort liability for
truthful publication of private matters unrelated to public affairs is constitutionally
permissible."). But cf Vickery, supra note 130, at 1436 (arguing no cause of action for
invasion of privacy should arise where private individuals speak about matters of private
concern to friends or family because an individual should be able to operate within a zone
of privacy without governmental interference).
162. This dicta appears in cases addressing the constitutionality of libel suits. While
this Article focuses on judicial protection of privacy in the context of privacy torts, one can
discern the Court's evaluation of the importance of privacy in the context of private
citizens by reference to the development of libel laws. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged
the relationship between libel and privacy law, stating that privacy suits "share[ J ... the
same underlying purpose invoked by the [Supreme] Court... in upholding the state's
interest in the law of libel ... " Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 n.8 (9th Cir.
1975). As it evolved, libel doctrine became more and more protective of speech regarding
public figures and increasingly protective of privacy and reputation when involving speech
regarding private individuals. This development culminated in Dun & Bradstreet, where
the Court ultimately held that to prevail in a defamation action, a private individual suing
for libel, concerning issues of private concern, may prevail without proving malice. Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). This standard is less
protective of speech than the standard applicable to public figures suing for speech on
matters of public concern. In that scenario, public figures must show malice in order to
prevail in a libel suit.
The Dun & Bradstreet Court found speech regarding private individuals and matters of
private concern simply of less First Amendment value than other speech: "In libel actions
brought by private persons we found the competing interests different. Largely because
private persons have not voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury ... and
because they generally lack effective opportunities for rebutting such statements, we
found that the State possessed a 'strong and legitimate ... interest in compensating private
individuals for injury to reputation."' Id. at 756 (quoting Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 345, 348-49 (1974)) (citation omitted). Such speech does not have constitutional
dimensions because "[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues;
there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-
government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the
press." Id. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363
(Or. 1977)). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72 n. 8 (1964) (stating that
different interests might be involved where purely private libels are concerned, as opposed
to libel suits involving the media).
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analytically identical to the deliberation by courts facing First
Amendment defenses to invasion of privacy suits.163 Courts would
assess the constitutionality by weighing the individual's interest in
privacy against the value of the speech. The public concern principle
elucidates the value of the speech. As illustrated by the review of
cases above, the nature of the information at stake can significantly
affect the assessment of the speech's constitutional value. Therefore,
the constitutionality of injunctions protecting HIV status, sexual
orientation, and immigration status may differ and will be discussed
in turn.
Turning first to injunctions protecting the confidentiality of HIV-
related information, one finds significant precedent in privacy
jurisprudence as guidance. The privacy interest in HIV-related
information appears strong. In Yoder v. Ingersoll-Rand, the Sixth
Circuit upheld a judgment for a plaintiff suing his employer under an
invasion of privacy theory for disclosing his HIV status.' 64 The court
held that the plaintiff had "no trouble establishing that his AIDS
status is clearly a private fact, the disclosure of which would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.' '165 Further, many courts have held
that the constitutional right to privacy covers HIV-related
information." The Second Circuit explained that the:
163. Significantly, the Third Circuit held that a threat to disclose private information is
as much an affront to privacy as the disclosure itself. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville,
232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000). This conclusion enabled the court to find the threat
actionable as an invasion of privacy. Id. This holding, again, is not significant in that it
might make actionable the batterer's threats. Instead, its significance rests on the court's
assessment of the importance of an individual's right to privacy. If an inchoate invasion of
privacy is actionable, then the court has found the damage potential wrought by the
disclosure to be substantial. In essence, the court permitted the imposition of liability for
future speech.
164. Yoder v. Ingersoll-Rand, No. 97-3710, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31993 (6th Cir. Dec.
22, 1998).
165. Id. at *6.
166. Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
"[i]ndividuals who are infected with the HIV virus clearly possess a constitutional right to
privacy regarding their condition"); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 (11th Cir. 1991)
(assuming a constitutionally protected privacy right related to HIV status); Doe v. Town
of Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Ma. 1993) (holding that constitutional right to
privacy encompasses HIV status); Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(stating the high degree of privacy protection that should be accorded to HIV information
contained in a presentence report); Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) (individual has constitutional right to privacy related to HIV status when
arrested); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 731 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (inmates have
a constitutional right to privacy covering unwarranted disclosure); Doe v. Borough of
Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990) (wife has a constitutional privacy right in
husband's HIV status such that it is protected against governmental disclosure by a police
[e]xtension of the right to confidentiality to personal medical
information recognizes there are few matters that are quite so
personal as the status of one's health, and few matters the
dissemination of which one would prefer to maintain greater
control over. Clearly, an individual's choice to inform others
that she has contracted what is at this point invariably and sadly
a fatal, incurable disease is one that she should normally be
allowed to make for herself .... An individual revealing that
she is HIV seropositive potentially exposes herself not to
understanding or compassion but to discrimination and
intolerance ....167
On the other hand, one could imagine that, under certain
circumstances, courts could deem HIV status to be of legitimate
public interest."6 For example, if the batterer threatened to reveal the
victim's HIV status to her employer where the victim is a health care
provider who does not employ universal precautions, the information
could prevent transmission. A court might even deem HIV-related
speech to have a political dimension because issues of funding for
AIDS research and discrimination against HIV positive individuals
play a role in public policy discussions. Exaggerated fear of HIV
transmission might render the injunction invalid in even the most
clear cut cases. The caselaw, however, indicates a strong judicial
preference for protecting the privacy of HIV-related information in
the absence of strong countervailing interests.
The legitimacy of the public's interest in sexual orientation is
even less significant. In general, the law characterizes sexual
orientation as a private matter not properly part of public dialogue
absent the subject's consent.'69 The Third Circuit recently considered
officer). Cf. Courts have further acknowledged the intimate and personal nature of HIV
information that is "fraught with serious implications for that individual." Doe v.
Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (acknowledging that family may
ostracize the individual with AIDS and that discrimination may accompany publication of
HIV status); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 384 & n.8 (stating that
disclosure may be accompanied by excessive harassment).
167. Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267.
168. A judge's assessment of the public's legitimate concern in HIV-related
information would be greatly affected by her own understanding and perception of the
disease. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (looking to
scientific data to determine the legitimate risk of HIV infection by a teacher to his
students). If she believed that infected individuals could responsibly safeguard against
transmission without disclosure, she might elevate the victim's interest in privacy. If
however, she feared transmission anarchy, then she very well might refuse to grant the
injunction. See generally Kohn, supra note 16, at n.105 (providing examples of and
commentary on fear of AIDS transmission).
169. Cf. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a rape victim has a
right to privacy that covers aspects of the rape that serve no penalogical interest);
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whether the constitutional right to privacy protects sexual
orientation.17" In Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, the court
considered whether a police officer violated an individual's right to
privacy by threatening to disclose the individual's sexual orientation
to his family. 7' After reviewing the Supreme Court precedent on
point, the court determined that the decedent-plaintiff's sexual
orientation was "an intimate aspect of his personality entitled to
privacy protection ... ,172 In fact, the court concluded that "[i]t is
difficult to imagine a more private matter than one's sexuality ....
The Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court cases of Whalen
v. Roe 74 and Roe v. Wade'75 for the broad proposition that the right to
privacy extends to protect individual autonomy in private matters and
an individual's interest in maintaining the secrecy of highly personal
information.6 The court acknowledged the ambiguity of Supreme
Court precedent regarding homosexuality by referring to Bowers v.
Hardwick.' In Bowers, the Court rejected the claim that the
Constitution establishes a "fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy."'7  The Sterling court, however, found that
Bowers did not correlatively deny a right to privacy regarding sexual
orientation. The court reasoned that Bowers permitted the regulation
of conduct but did not "purport to punish homosexual status," which
would have contradicted the Supreme Court's proscription on
criminalizing status.'79
Eastwood v. Dept. of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
constitutional right to privacy is implicated by a forced disclosure regarding sexual
matters); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the right
to privacy covers sexual behavior); Greenwood v. Taft, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (stating that a litigant might be able to prevail in a privacy suit against an
employer for publicizing his sexual orientation). But see Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396
(3d Cir. 1999) (stating that an individual's constitutional right to privacy over sexual
behavior may be subordinate to the government's interest in disclosure in cases involving
sexual predators).
170. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000).
171. The court held that the threat to disclose the information constituted actionable
invasion of privacy. See supra note 163.
172. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196.
173. Id.
174. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
175. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
176. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
177. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 194 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
178. Id. at 191.
179. Sterling at 195 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
[Vol. 29:
Historically, allegations regarding sexual orientation have no
First Amendment value. Public statements about another's sexual
orientation have even been subject to government regulation as a
crime. Allegations of sodomy, whether true or false, have been
recognized as acts constituting robbery or extortion.18 ° Courts and
legislatures determined that such allegations deprived the target of
the gossip of his reputation in the community. 8' Sodomy was
considered such a grave accusation, that simply threatening to allege
it could have coercive consequences. As a Maryland court explained:
If a man threatens to accuse another of an unnatural crime,
sodomy, and thereby obtains property from him, the law
regards it as robbery, because this offense is so loathsome
that the fear of loss of character from such a charge, however
unfounded it may be, is sufficient to reasonably induce a man
to give up his property.82
While none of these statutes was challenged on First
Amendment grounds, as recently as 1970 these laws were still on the
books. 83 Such statutes indicate that legislatures historically did not
view either truthful or defamatory statements regarding sexual
orientation as valuable speech. The commission of sodomy was not
viewed as a matter of public concern that might weigh heavily in the
balance against privacy.' 4
However, one could argue that a person's sexual orientation is a
matter of public concern. One might argue that it is relevant to her
professional competence in certain jobs.'85 Litigants have asserted
180. Thompson v. State, 85 N.W. 62, 64 (Neb. 1901) (citation omitted) ("'As to the fear
of injury to the reputation' says Greenleaf, 'it has been repeatedly held that to obtain
money by threatening to accuse the party of an unnatural crime, whether the
consequences apprehended by the victim were a criminal prosecution, the loss of his place,
or the loss of his character and position in society, is robbery."').
181. Mo. REV. STAT. § 560.130 (repealed); State v. Patterson, 196 S.W. 3 (Mo. 1917)
("An indictment for robbery by extortion under [] 560.130, alleging the defendant
threatened to accuse a third person of the crime of sodomy, which was named, but not
defined.., was sufficient as a naming of the offense which [the] accused threatened to
charge.").
182. Giles v. State, 261 A.2d 806, 808 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (quoting CLARK &
MARSHALL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 12.14, at 791 (6th ed. 1958)).
183. Id. (enforcing law criminalizing the accusations of sodomy).
184. But cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the act of sodomy is
not entitled to constitutional protection).
185. See, e.g., Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (setting forth the Boy Scout's
argument that a gay scout leader may have his scoutmaster position revoked because
homosexuality is inconsistent with Boy Scout values); Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of
Educ., No. CIV-80-1174-E, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17588, at *26 (W.D. Okla. June 29,
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that information regarding sexual orientation is relevant to health and
safety because it correlates to HIV status.'86 Some might argue that
sexual orientation has a political dimension that would transform
gossip into political speech.87
An individual who has widely publicized her sexual orientation
may also find it more difficult to argue that her status is not a matter
of public concern. In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing, the court
confronted a case in which a gay man blocked an assassination
attempt on President Ford. A subsequent newspaper article lauded
the man for his heroism and mentioned his sexual orientation. The
article also suggested a correlation between the individual's sexual
orientation and the absence of an official gesture of gratitude from
the White House. The individual sued for invasion of privacy. A
California court held his sexual orientation was not a private fact that
could be the subject of an invasion of privacy suit because the plaintiff
had widely publicized his status before the publication of the article.
Further, the court found that the information was published with the
intent to serve a political purpose, which further insulated the
defendant from liability.'88 The court held that:
the record shows that the publications were not motivated by a
morbid and sensational prying into [plaintiff's] private life but
rather were prompted by legitimate political considerations, i.e.,
to dispel the false public opinion that gays were timid, weak and
unheroic figures and to raise the equally important political
question whether the President of the United States entertained
1982) (holding that public homosexual activity would affect a teacher's performance and
stating that "[o]bviously, the legislature has perceived that public homosexual conduct by
a teacher might render him unfit to teach. This is not a totally irrational perception or a
clearly erroneous idea."); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (acknowledging
that an employee's homosexual conduct might affect his efficiency); Holmes v. Cal. Army
Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing court decisions holding that
homosexuality legitimately interferes with military efficiency). But cf. Glover v.
Williamsburg Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998)
(holding that homosexual individuals are entitled to at least the same constitutional
protection as any other identifiable group).
186. See, e.g., Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000)
("Public health or like public concerns may justify access to information an individual may
desire to remain confidential. In examining right to privacy claims, we, therefore, balance
a possible and responsible government interest in disclosure against the individual's
privacy interest.") (citations omitted); Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987) (considering whether a landlord may refuse to rent an apartment to gay men on the
grounds that they may become infected with HIV).
187. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040 (1984)
(holding that sexual orientation implicates political issues in certain circumstances).
188. Id.
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a discriminatory attitude or bias against a minority group such
as homosexuals.'
Because the journalist had a legitimate purpose for discussing the
plaintiff's sexual orientation, the First Amendment protected the
information.
But in the vast majority of cases arising in the context of a
domestic violence speech restriction, the victim's sexual orientation
would not properly be a matter of public concern.1" In most cases,
information about the victim's sexual orientation will simply be a
weapon used by the batterer to exert power and control over the
victim."' If, as Sipple indicated, the intent of the individual
publicizing the information is not relevant to the public concern
inquiry, then the victim's sexual orientation should be an important
protected privacy interest. The timing of the batterer's publication of
the information would suggest that the batterer's intent does not have
a political or public health dimension. If the batterer intended to
disseminate the information in order to serve political or public
health goals, then he would share the information regardless of the
victim's willingness to stay in the relationship. However, because he
threatened to divulge the information only as retribution for her non-
compliance with his wishes, his intent would seem clearly nefarious
and void of political or health goals.
Finally, we turn to the privacy interest in immigration status.
While there are few invasion of privacy cases related to immigration
status, ' public policy suggests that it might form the basis for a
compelling privacy interest. Although an illegal act ordinarily would
be of legitimate public concern, Congress has suggested that in the
context of domestic violence and immigration, information about
189. Id. at 1049.
190. This discussion raises the issue of whether characterizing homosexuality as a
private matter is normatively advisable. While some gay individuals would prefer to be
entitled to exert control over access to the information, others might find deeming the
matter private to be stigmatizing. Declaring that an individual's sexual orientation should
not be discussed without the permission of the individual suggests the matter is actually
shameful. For an interesting discussion of sexual orientation and the public/private
distinction, see David A. J. Richards, The Privatization of Our Public Discourse: Public
and Private in the Discourse of the First Amendment, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 61, 89-
95 (2000).
191. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Cardona v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, No.
93 C3912, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1853, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1995) (alluding to a
possible privacy interest in immigration status); Crespin v. Kizer, 226 Cal. App. 3d 498, 523
n.26 (1990) (assuming without deciding that immigration status is protected by the
constitutional right to privacy).
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immigration status obtained from a battering spouse is of little public
value. In 1994, through the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
Congress amended certain sections of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. to address the specific
quandary for battered women petitioning for immigration through
their abusive spouses. Under the VAWA amendments, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was prohibited from
making an adverse judgment on a petition for a battered woman
based solely on evidence supplied by a spouse who battered the
petitioner. '93  Additionally, the battering spouse is under no
affirmative obligation to report information concerning the petitioner
to the INS.'94 Finally, Congress further expanded protection for
battered immigrant women when it passed the Violence Against
Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386 (VAWA 2000). Through
VAWA 2000, Congress provided expanded options to attain
immigration status to battered immigrant women who are not the
spouses of citizens or lawful permanent residents.9
Congress specifically considered the plight of a battered woman
whose abuser used threats of interfering with her immigration process
as a means of trapping the woman in an abusive relationship.
Title V [of the Battered Immigrant Women's Protection Act of
2000] continues the work of the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 in removing obstacles inadvertently interposed by our
immigration laws that may hinder or prevent battered
immigrants from fleeing domestic violence safely and
prosecuting their abusers by allowing an abusive citizen or
lawful permanent resident to blackmail the abused spouse
through threats related to the abused spouse's immigration
status.'
These congressional actions suggest that the legislature, at least,
has determined that the batterer's information regarding the victim's
immigration status is of little value to the INS. First, his reports are
not required and may not even be the basis for INS decisions.
Further, Congress has expressed an intent to provide special
assistance to immigrant victims of domestic violence. The statute
indicates that her status as a battered woman is of more interest to the
INS than any information about her immigration status that the
batterer could provide. In the face of these legislative
193. 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1)(A) (2001).
194. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), 1186a(c) (2001).
195. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513 (2000).
196. 146 CONG. REC. S10188-03 (2000).
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pronouncements that reveal that immigration status is not a matter of
great public concern, a court might allocate very little weight to the
batterer's interest in communicating the information and great weight
to the immigrant-victim's privacy interest in controlling the
information.
B. The state's interest in protection of the family
When a victim of domestic violence requests an injunction
restricting the batterer from divulging personal information about
her, her privacy is not the only interest at stake. In issuing an
injunction, a court might also consider the state's interest in
protecting the victim from continuing domestic violence and
safeguarding any children involved from the detrimental effects of the
speech. Courts routinely act to protect these interests in the context
of family law. Less frequently, but illustratively, courts weigh these
interests against free expression in the context of injunctions on
speech. This section focuses on the general strength of the state's
interest in the well being of children and in protection from domestic
violence, analyzing the specific treatment of speech balanced against
these interests.
As the paramount factor in child custody cases and divorce
cases,197 courts consider the best interests of the child.98 Physical and
legal custody, visitation schedules, and parenting conditions depend
on the needs of the children as perceived by the court. The parents'
own needs are secondary to the child's. This interest in children's
health and well-being can even override a parent's significant
conflicting liberty interest.
Acting to protect the welfare of children, a New Jersey court
ordered a husband to relinquish his property rights to his marital
residence even in the absence of any proof of physical or emotional
injury to the children.9 After a divorce action vested property rights
of the marital home in both the mother and father, the father-
defendant left the marital home voluntarily. Seventeen months later
he returned without warning and commandeered the master
bedroom. The court found that although the plaintiff presented no
evidence of actual trauma to the children, the defendant-father's
197. See In re Olson, 850 P.2d 527, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the welfare
of the children is the State's central concern in marriage dissolutions).
198. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(3) (2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(a)
(2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(1) (2000).
199. Degenaars v. Degenaars, 452 A.2d 222 (1982).
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presence compromised the welfare of the children. "[I]t would be
inimical to the best interests and welfare of the plaintiff and the
children to permit their lives, both emotionally and physically, to be
traumatically invaded by the defendant's unilateral decision to
resume residency in the marital home."2"°
In another case, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed an
injunction that significantly intruded upon freedom of association. °'
In Henley v. Rockett, the court affirmed an injunction prohibiting a
woman from associating with her extramarital partner in any way."
The court found that the woman had alienated the affections of her
paramour. Because the adulterous relationship compromised the
"sacredness of the family relation," provided a negative example for
the children, and reflected badly upon the children, the court found
that the injunction appropriately restricted the woman's freedoms. 3
Protection from abuse, another interest at stake in the family law
context, provides the basis for the constitutionality of domestic
violence restraining orders that constrain certain liberties. °" The
Supreme Court of South Dakota unambiguously stated that "without
a doubt, domestic abuse protection orders preserve compelling
governmental interests."2 5 Another court questioned whether a First
Amendment challenge to a domestic violence order could ever
prevail, given the strength of the state's interest in protecting citizens
from domestic abuse.
Several courts have confronted the direct conflict between the
interest in child welfare and protection from domestic violence on
one hand and free speech on the other. In State v. Hauge, the South
200. Id.
201. See also Stark v. Hamilton, 99 S.E. 861 (Ga. 1919) (affirming an injunction
prohibiting a man from talking to or coming near a woman he had "debauched... and
induced.., to abandon her parental abode and live with him in a state of adultery and
fornication" in order to protect the child from harm).
202. Henley v. Rockett, 8 So. 2d 852, 855 (Ala. 1942).
203. Id.
204. See Schramek v. Schramek, 429 N.W.2d 501 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a
restraining order's no contact provision does not infringe on free speech because it is
directed not at speech but at the suppression of physical abuse). See generally, Klein &
Orloff, supra note 28, at 905-10 (reviewing decisions related to the constitutionality of
restraining orders).
205. State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173 (S.D. 1996).
206. Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) ("We... first reject
any notion that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution ... ever covered
threatening or abusive communications to persons who have demonstrated a need for
protection from an immediate and present danger of domestic abuse.").
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Dakota Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a content-
neutral protection order enjoining the respondent from sending
letters to the petitioner. After balancing the "compelling
governmental interest[]" in stopping domestic abuse against the
respondent's right to free expression, the court affirmed the order.
"In the midst of domestic strife, preserving the mental and emotional
health of the vulnerable must overcome other less compelling
interests.""2 7 Although the speech restriction regulated speech in a
content-neutral fashion,"' the court took pains to characterize the
state's interest as compelling, suggesting that even a content-based
injunction might survive constitutional scrutiny.
Cases involving content-based restrictions in the family law
context often seem ludicrous in both their specificity and in the extent
of their intrusion into personal lives. These cases, however, suggest
how a court might respond to a domestic violence speech restriction
enjoining the dissemination of HIV, immigration, or sexual
orientation information to third parties. In a particularly odd case,
the Florida Supreme Court ordered a mother, as part of a divorce
agreement, to do all that was in her power to convince her children
that she wished the children to see and love their father.0 9 Against a
First Amendment challenge, the court upheld the divorce provision
because the state's interest in the welfare of children outweighed the
burden on her speech. The court stated that:
[t]here is no question that the state's interests in restoring a
meaningful relationship between the parties' children and their
father, thereby promoting the best interests of the children, is at
the very least substantial. Likewise, any restriction placed on
the mother's freedom of expression is essential to the
furtherance of the state's interests because affirmative measures
taken by the mother to encourage meaningful interaction
between the children and their father would be for naught if she
were allowed to contradict those measures by word or deed.210
While the interest in protection of children and protection from
violence is strong, some courts also have found speech restrictions
targeted at restraining speech to third parties to be constitutionally
infirm. One court partially invalidated an injunction prohibiting an
207. Id. at 176.
208. See In re Higbee, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 1416, c7-97-1588 (Dec. 30, 1997) for
another case affirming the constitutionality of a content-neutral speech restriction
contained in a domestic violence restraining order.
209. Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Fla. 1991).
210. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1293.
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individual from making disparaging remarks about his wife to their
children.21' To the extent the disparaging remarks were defamatory,
the court found no constitutional infirmity with the injunction.
However, noting that the state had a strong interest in fostering
positive relationships between parents and their children, the court
limited the injunction to cover defamatory statements, maintaining
that content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid and found
no justification for rebutting the presumption.t 2
In a case involving a speech restriction resembling the speech
restriction analyzed in this Article, a court invalidated a provision
enjoining a party from disseminating information to third parties
about her former husband's new wife. 2 '3 The court acknowledged, in
In re Candiotti, the harm to the children posed by the malicious gossip
at issue. However, the court found that under the California
Constitution, the injunction suffered from overbreadth because it
prevented the woman from talking privately to everyone about the
topic. Further, the court found that such speech was "too attenuated
from conduct directly affecting the children to support a prior
restraint ... ,21' Although the court stressed that the California
Constitution is more protective of speech than the U.S.
Constitution,215 this case may well reflect the reaction of some courts
to similar challenges under the U.S. Constitution.
A woman needing the protection of a domestic violence speech
restriction enjoining the dissemination of HIV, sexual orientation, or
immigration information would be acting to enable herself and any
children to escape an abusive relationship, to insulate herself from
any negative repercussions from the publication of the information,
and to safeguard her children from derivative injury from the
dissemination. As revealed above, courts characterize these interests
as strong, if not very compelling. A speech restriction prohibiting
dissemination to specific audiences would not suffer from the fatal
overbreadth of the injunction struck in In re Candiotti. Under such
an injunction, the court would leave the batterer with countless
211. In re Olson, 850 P.2d at 532.
212. Id.
213. In re Candiotti, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 303. (Under the California Constitution, "Every person may freely speak,
write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
this right .... " (emphasis added). The court explicitly stated that "this provision is more
definitive and inclusive that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.").
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alternative audiences for his speech. For example, the batterer would
be entitled to speak ad nauseum to his friends, family, and health
professionals about the victim's HIV status. The restriction would
constrain his speech only in relation to the specific audiences that the
victim fears will react adversely to the information.
The state's strong established interests in promoting the welfare
of children and protecting victims of domestic violence confirm that
under certain circumstances the batterer's speech rights would be
overcome in a constitutional analysis.
V. A Domestic Violence Speech Restriction Does Not Present
an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint on Speech
At the time a court issues a domestic violence speech restriction,
the batterer has merely threatened to speak the privacy-invading
words; the actual utterance of the words is still inchoate. Restraints
on future speech bear a presumption of invalidity,216 because they
stifle speech before it has aired and undergone an adequate analysis
of its constitutional value.217 Moreover, prior restraints risk gagging
unanticipated audiences and suppressing unintended speech.
While the prohibition on prior restraints of future speech is
strong, it is not a conclusive hurdle."' The Supreme Court has
emphasized that not all injunctions on future speech are
impermissible and that the rule against prior restraints should not
serve as "a talismanic test."219 For example, in Kingsley Books v.
Brown, Justice Frankfurter advocated a flexible, "pragmatic,"
individualized approach to prior restraint analysis.2
The typical invalid prior restraint on speech enjoins the press
from publishing newsworthy information.221 This type of restriction
triggers the constitutional drafters' original concerns about
216. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
217. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973).
218. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1212 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1978) (Spreecher, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]his label is merely an aid to categorization of First Amendment
restraints.., the cry of prior restraint is a classic example of the tyranny of words which
often accompanies the uncritical employment of a once-useful phrase.").
219. Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
220. Id. at 442.
221. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating a court
order restraining the press from publishing or broadcasting defendant's admissions and
facts implicating defendant during criminal trial); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (striking a court order enjoining newspapers from publishing a classified
historical study on Viet Nam policy, the "Pentagon Papers").
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government suppression of the press.2 Judicial analysis of prior
restraints issued against non-media actors is somewhat more lax.
Courts often permit restraints on the future speech of private parties
when there has been a prior adjudication of the constitutional value
of the speech. 3  Courts have held that if past conduct has already
24 221 ohewsbeen adjudicated illegal, tortious, or otherwise lacking in
constitutional protection,26 then future conduct constitutionally may
222. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 717 ("Both the history and language of the First
Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever
the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 716 (1930) (referring to the historical importance of freedom of the press from
prior restraints on speech).
223. See Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (stating that a
prior restraint may avoid constitutional infirmity by bearing the indicia of certain
procedural safeguards including a judicial determination).
224. When a statutory provision has been violated, caselaw is replete with decisions
affirming the issuance of injunctions prohibiting future speech contravening the provision.
See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
390 (1973) (upholding an injunction against newspaper which violated municipal sex
discrimination ordinance which prohibited newspaper from publishing advertisements in a
discriminatory format because order would not go into effect before final determination
that speech was not constitutionally protected).
225. Courts will routinely uphold injunctions against speech constituting defamation
and libel. See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding an
injunction to prohibit defendant from repeating libelous and defamatory statements);
Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984) ("We
therefore hold that the injunction below, limited as it is to material found either libelous or
disparaging after a full jury trial, is not unconstitutional and may stand."); O'Brien v.
Univ. Cmty. Tenants, 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975) ("Once speech has judicially been
found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive relief are met, an injunction for
restraint of continued publication of that same speech may be proper.") (italics in
original); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62-63 (Ga. 1975) (affirming an
injunction prohibiting future libelous speech because there had been a jury verdict finding
similar speech defamatory prior to the issuance of the injunction).
226. See, e.g., San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d
1230 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming injunction against union prohibiting continuing display of
signs near hospital entrance reading "This Medical Facility is Full of Rats" after a full
hearing to determine the language was fraudulent and therefore unprotected). Another
such injunction on future speech appears in the context of a bankruptcy dispute. In a
Massachusetts case, a company submitted a bankruptcy plan to the court and received
approval. The plan included a provision enjoining a director from entering the company
premises or communicating with employees about company operations. The director
appealed from the bankruptcy court to district court alleging that the injunction presented
an unconstitutional prior restraint on his free speech. The court upheld the injunction,
finding that while the director's behavior did not violate any specific statute or regulation,
it interfered with the company's bankruptcy plan. At trial in bankruptcy court, the court
issued the injunction "based upon a continuing course of repetitive conduct and granted
after a final adjudication on the merits. To the extent that the speech of Haseotes
constitutes conduct in violation of the [bankruptcy] Plan, it is not protected by the First
Amendment." Haseotes v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 216 B.R. 690, 695 (Bankr. D. Mass.
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be enjoined.22 1 "[O]nce a court has found a specific pattern of speech
unlawful, an injunctive order prohibiting repetition, perpetuation, or
continuation of that practice is not a prohibited 'prior restraint' on
speech."' 28 Because a court has already judged the enjoined speech to
be of low value before the order is issued, the restriction does not
implicate the interests protected by the presumption against prior
restraints. For example, after a full hearing on the matter, a court
issuing an injunction would not be forced to speculate about the
nature of the speech to be enjoined. Therefore, the injunction would
not raise significant potential for suppression of protected speech.
The injunction issues no abstract command that may reach an absent
audience and have a pervasive chill on speech.
While there is no steadfast rule regarding the procedural
sufficiency of a prior adjudication, the caselaw reveals a consensus
that a hearing on the merits adequately assesses the constitutionality
of the speech.229 The litigant gets his day in court and the court enjoys
the opportunity to analyze the speech. The clearest illustration of the
constitutionality of prior restraints based on prior adjudication
appears in cases involving statutory violations and obscenity
doctrine.230
1997).
227. Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The United States
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that an injunction against speech generally will not be
considered an unconstitutional prior restraint if it is issued after ... [it] has [been]
determined that the speech is not constitutionally protected.").
228. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 858 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1138 (2000).
229. Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1957) (holding that an adversary
hearing to determine whether material is obscene ensures that any subsequent injunction
will not be a prior restraint); Haseotes, 216 B.R. at 695 (holding a full hearing before the
bankruptcy court was sufficient to determine that the speech was part of a repetitive
course of conduct and not meriting First Amendment protections).
230. Another context in which courts routinely issue prior restraints on speech is
litigation discovery. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), courts may issue
protective orders regarding discovery material whenever good cause is shown. FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(c). Most states have adopted equivalent local rules permitting the issuance of
protective orders. These orders, if temporary in nature, are uniformly found constitutional
prior restraints on speech. Protective orders have been upheld against prior restraint
challenges because they are limited in duration and scope. See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart,
467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that protective order did not offend First Amendment);
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976). In Seattle Times, the
Supreme Court distinguished protective orders from other restraints on future speech
because the context of pretrial discovery is such that the information is limited to a very
narrow scope and the protective order applies only to information learned in the context
of discovery. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32. Further, the Court found that because courts
have substantial interest in the privacy and reputation of those involved in litigation, a
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A. Statutory violations
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S., the
Supreme Court considered an injunction issued against a trade
association that violated the federal antitrust statute.231' The district
court found that the trade association's code of ethics violated
antitrust law by discouraging competitive bidding by its members.232
The injunction restricted the association from issuing any opinion,
policy statement, or guideline stating that competitive bidding is
unethical.233 The association argued that the injunction was an invalid
prior restraint on speech because it enjoined future publication of
codes of ethics.234 The Supreme Court, however, found the injunction
to be valid and enforceable because the court had determined that
the code of ethics had violated antitrust law. In fact, the injunction
swept broadly and enjoined even more speech that a simple repetition
of the same violation.235  The Court stated that, in order to remedy
court can and often must act to protect those interests. Id. at 35.
While restraining orders are similarly temporary in nature, the analysis of protective
orders offers little insight to the issue at hand. The limited context in which protective
orders are permitted suggests that an analogy is far-fetched. Courts have a special interest
in protecting the privacy of information learned during discovery because the parties have
submitted to the court's procedural rules. Further, protective orders restrain information
only learned during discovery. See id. at 33 ("[Rjestraints placed on discovered, but not
yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of
information."). This can be an extremely narrow scope of information. On the other
hand, the information sought to be restrained in a domestic violence speech restriction has
been shared prior to any court involvement and therefore is much more part of the public
domain. The Seattle Times Court explicitly stressed the narrow applicability of protective
order precedent in prior restraint doctrine: "In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability
to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment
rights of the restricted parties to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination
of information in a different context." Id. at 34.
231. Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
232. Id.
233. Courts issuing injunctions under the Sherman Act are not the only actors entitled
to issue broad restrictions because of past unlawful conduct, on what might otherwise be
lawful speech. Congress authorized the issuance of prior restraints by the National Labor
Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission. By statute, the two agencies are
empowered to issue cease and desist orders to private parties who have violated labor and
antitrust laws respectively. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2001); 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2001). See also
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Saja, No. CIV-97-0666-PHX-SMM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17225
(D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 1997) (upholding the constitutionality of an FTC cease and desist order).
Often these cease and desist orders restrict speech by forbidding certain expression in
violation of federal law. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-620
(1969).
234. Nat'l Ass'n of Profl Engineers, 435 U.S. at 679.
235. Id. at 697.
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antitrust violations, a court must sometimes impose injunctive relief
that burdens constitutional rights:
While the resulting order may curtail the exercise of liberties
that the Society might otherwise enjoy, that is a necessary
and... unavoidable consequence of the violation .... In
fashioning a remedy, the District Court may, of course, consider
the fact that its injunction may impinge on rights that would
otherwise be constitutionally protected, but those protections
do not prevent it from remedying the antitrust violations.236
The Court reasoned that any threat to legitimate expression
could be alleviated by the Society's petitioning the court for relief.
237
As discussed above in Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System, the
California Supreme Court upheld an injunction prohibiting an Avis
supervisor from using derogatory speech descriptive of Hispanic or
Latino employees after the district court found that the supervisor's
past conduct had violated the state anti-discrimination statute.238 The
court held that this injunction against future speech was not an invalid
prior restraint on speech. "Under well established law ... the
injunction at issue is not an invalid prior restraint, because the order
was issued only after the jury determined that defendants had
engaged in employment discrimination, and the order simply
precluded defendants from continuing their unlawful activity." '239
Arguably, like the speech restriction in National Association, the
Avis injunction precludes even more speech than would be unlawful
under the anti-discrimination statute. Using ethnic epithets
descriptive of Hispanic workers may be perfectly lawful if it does not
become pervasive or severe enough to alter working conditions.24
The court, however, did not instruct the lower court to limit the scope
of the injunction to unlawful speech.
B. Prior adjudication finding speech unprotected
Courts also issue permissible injunctions on future speech after
an adjudication determining the speech lacked constitutional
protection. Beginning in 1931 with Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme
Court has painstakingly noted that in the context of obscenity,
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1138 (2000). See also supra notes
62-66 and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of the Avis decision.
239. Id. at 856-57.
240. Id. at 850.
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freedom of speech is not absolute, nor is the ban on prior restraints.241
For example, to protect the public welfare, courts can enjoin the
publication of obscene matter that may offend community decency.2
The Supreme Court stated in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago that the
"capacity for evil" associated with the speech is relevant to the
permissible judicial remedy, intimating that under certain
circumstances a restraint on future speech may be necessary.2 3 A
total ban on prior restraints would incapacitate the states from best
controlling their own social problems.2"
After Times Film, the Court stepped further into the arena of
obscenity and prior restraints with Kingsley Books v. Brown and
Freedman v. Maryland. In these cases, the Supreme Court stated that
courts may enjoin future publication of matter adjudicated obscene at
an adversary hearing. 5 In Freedman v. Maryland the Supreme Court
held that the statutory scheme requiring that filmmakers submit their
movies to the Maryland censorship board for approval before
distribution created an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech
because the procedural safeguards were inadequate.2 6 Analyzing the
statutory scheme devised by the legislation, the Court found that the
exhibitor did not have an adequate opportunity to be heard on the
propriety of censorship once the movie had been rejected. The
censor's decision could not act as a final adjudication of protected
expression.247  The Court stated that the best way to ensure that
constitutionally protected speech would not be enjoined is an
adversary proceeding: "The teaching of our cases is that, because only
a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final
restraint. '248
When analyzing restraints on potential obscene publications,
courts will permit a restraint where an adversary hearing has led to
241. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,715-716 (1931); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
155 (1959) (observing that the states possess the power to "prevent the distribution of
obscene matter").
242. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43,49-50 (1961).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965); Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436, 441 (1957).
246. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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the determination that the speech is unprotected. After this
determination, the state actor may consider the potential for harm
presented by the speech and fashion a remedy that can best protect
the public while minimally burdening speech.
C. Application of the prior adjudication principle to a domestic
violence speech restriction
In the context of a domestic violence speech restriction, a court
would have the opportunity to make a determination about the value
of the speech prior to issuing the restraint. Protection order statutes
would ensure that there would be a prior adjudication of the
batterer's statutory violation. A victim requesting an order enjoining
speech about her health, sexual orientation, or immigration status
would be required to petition the court for such relief.24 9  The
opposing party would be given an opportunity for an adversary
hearing. In most jurisdictions, a judge would issue a protection
order only if she had found that the batterer had violated a criminal
statute. Once the court established a statutory violation, the caselaw
indicates that the court would be able to issue a broad restriction to
avoid both a recurrence of that conduct as well as future speech that
is part and parcel of that conduct. Just as in National Association and
Avis, the batterer would have forfeited the right to speak in certain
ways based on his past conduct.
When the victim is before the court proving the abuse, she would
also be able to present the facts necessary to make an assessment of
the protected nature of the speech. In an adversarial trial, the judge
would determine whether the batterer has a protected right to speech
divulging the victim's personal information. This procedural
safeguard may adequately address prior restraint concerns raised by
the domestic violence speech restriction.
If the court considered the "capacity for evil" presented by the
privacy-invading speech,252 as it did in Times Film, then it might well
conclude that a prior restraint is the most effective - potentially the
249. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a) (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(a) (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. 16-1005 (2001).
250. Id.
251. What remains unknown is the effect on the prior restraint analysis of a batterer's
consent to a restraining order or a default judgment. If the speaker merely has an
opportunity for an adversary hearing, but forfeits that right, may a court enter a restraint
on his future speech merely in an ex parte analysis of the nature of the speech? Caselaw is
silent on this question.
252. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1961).
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only effective - means to protect the victim. The speech, by its very
utterance, may decimate the victim's personal or professional life.
The destruction may be irreparable. Given societal biases, HIV and
sexual orientation status may have severe social and professional
repercussions. In the case of immigration status, a federal actor might
swiftly deport the victim. If the propriety of prior restraints depends
even remotely on the expression's potential for destruction, then a
court might find ample comfort in issuing a prospective restraint on
the batterer's speech in a domestic violence situation.
The Supreme Court stated in Nebraska Press that prior restraints
should generally be avoided because they are final and irreversible,
whereas criminal and civil remedies to speech are subject to appellate
review and are therefore safer.253 However, this rationale does not
apply to a situation where there has been an individualized hearing
adjudicating a statutory violation and assessing the nature of the
speech, and where the harm to be caused by the speech is
unredressible by subsequent lawsuits. As discussed earlier, once this
speech has been published, the victim may have been irreversibly
damaged. This is the speech that Professor Lawrence Tribe refers to
as unprotected speech "projectiles," which constitute no part of a
dialogue."4 Criminal and civil remedies are useless to this victim.
Moreover, appellate review is always available to a litigant in a
domestic violence case who believes that his freedom of speech has
been unconstitutionally restrained.
The reasoning behind the constitutionality of prior restraints
where the speech has been the subject of a prior adjudication is
particularly appropriate in the context of injunctions. A judge may
issue an injunction after she has heard the factual allegations
substantiating the issuance of an injunction. She has the opportunity
to narrowly tailor the injunction to the specific context and specific
litigant, guarding against a generalized chill on speech or the
unwitting gagging of absent parties."' Further, the Supreme Court
253. Neb. Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
254. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 837 (2d ed.
1988).
255. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 778 (1994) (Souter, J.
dissenting) (stating that injunctions should be given more leeway when judged for
constitutional infringement because the remedy is so narrowly tailored that it applies only
to the litigant and not to society at large); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d
846, 861 (Cal. 1999) (citing Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997)); Gallo v. Acuna, 929
P.2d 596, 610-611 (Cal. 1997), cert. denied sub nom., Gonzalez v. Gallo, 521 U.S. 1121
(1997) (emphasizing the salient differences between a statutory command and an
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has held that trial courts should have some discretion in issuing
injunctions once illegal conduct has been found, even in the realm of
injunctions potentially touching on constitutional concerns, because
"the district court has firsthand experience with the parties and is best
qualified to deal with the flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day
implementation of constitutional commands." '256
Because the court would have authority to issue the domestic
violence injunction only if the injunction were proposed as part of a
restraining order hearing, the court would have the chance to
narrowly tailor the injunction to prohibit only the particular speech
that had been threatened by the batterer. The court would also be
able to craft the injunction to permit the batterer to speak about the
topic to other audiences that do not pose a threat to the victim. For
example, if the batterer wanted to talk to his own physician about the
victim's HIV status, he would be able to do so. Therefore, the court
would not be forced to speculate about potential breadth and reach of
the injunction in inhibiting valid speech.
Although a domestic violence speech restriction would carry a
presumption of invalidity because it restrains future speech, the
statutory scheme that permits its existence suggests that it should fall
into' the class of restrictions that does not offend the First
Amendment.
VI. What Would a Constitutional Order Look Like?
A domestic violence speech restriction's constitutionality will
depend on the context of the battering relationship and the drafting
of the order. First, the batterer must have committed abusive acts
against the victim, thereby entitling her to protection under her state
protection order statute. If she is not entitled to a protection order on
the basis of the abuse, then the court has no authority to issue a
speech restriction. The state statute must incorporate a catch-all
relief provision, authorizing the court to implement any relief
required to effectively end the abuse. Second, the circumstances of
the abuse and coercion must render substantial the state's interest in
protecting the victim's privacy, safety, or the welfare of any children
involved. Without a strong state interest in issuing the injunction, this
speech restriction will not be a valid infringement on the batterer's
injunction that renders an injunction less constitutionally infirm). But see Madsen, 512
U.S. at 764-65 (reasoning that because injunctions represent judicial fiat, they require
more stringent application of First Amendment principles).
256. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987).
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free speech rights. Third, the history of the batterer's abuse and
manipulation will need to prove the low constitutional value of the
speech. Because context is vital to the constitutional valuation of
speech, the victim will need to present extensive evidence of the
batterer's threat to reveal the information as a coercive tool to keep
her in the relationship. Moreover, to illustrate the minimal value of
the speech, the victim will need to establish that the dissemination
would not significantly serve public welfare. For example, she will
need to show that the audiences who the batterer would address if
permitted are not endangered by their lack of access to the
information at issue.
The injunction itself will need to be carefully drafted. To satisfy
constitutional dictates, the injunction will need to incorporate an
explicit intent requirement. The intent requirement allows the
injunction to fall squarely into the blackmail paradigm, suggesting the
speech is of minimal constitutional value. Because the violation of
the speech restriction will require a wrongful intent, the injunction
will not prohibit the batterer from speaking in ways that are socially
valuable and innocuous to the victim.
In order to avoid invalidity as a prior restraint, the order will
need to issue after an adjudication determining either that the
batterer's conduct constituted a statutory violation, or that the speech
was of low constitutional value. When a victim presents evidence of a
criminal act in order to obtain the protection order, the court will be
able to issue the speech restriction as relief necessary to remedy the
effects of the past statutory violation. On the other hand, when a
victim can and is required only to present evidence of abuse that may
not constitute a statutory violation, the court will be able to grant a
speech restriction only after a full adversarial hearing on the nature of
the speech.
Finally, any domestic violence speech restriction will need to be
narrowly tailored, leaving the batterer extensive alternative avenues
for speech. There will need to be an identifiable nexus between the
enjoined speech and the state's protected interests. For example, the
order must not prohibit the batterer from discussing his HIV status
with a health care provider. Such a proscription would not
substantially serve the state's interest in protecting the victim from
abuse or from a breach of privacy.
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Conclusion
When an abusive partner realizes that the victim truly has made
affirmative efforts to leave him, he may feel emasculated. His threats,
protestations of love, and domestic terrorism have all proved futile in
his efforts to retain control over her. It is at this time that many
batterers turn to other devices to exert domination over the fleeing
partner. It is at this time that the risk of serious violence in intimate
relationships is at its hight.27 After the victim has made efforts to
escape, the batterer is most likely to seek to retaliate against her by
sabotaging the independent life she tries to establish for herself. One
commentator dubbed this phenomenon "postseparation woman
abuse," characterizing it by the batterer's desire to "gain, retain, or
regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the
relationship.""2 8 Victims consistently relay stories of the batterer's
false reports to child protective services; false "anonymous" tip offs to
employers about the victim's disloyalty or dishonesty; and calls to
employers or family members revealing damaging, truthful personal
information about the victim. 259  While the batterer may have
threatened to reveal this information in order to keep her in the
relationship, once he receives court paper work confirming the
victim's desire to end the relationship, he is likely to follow through
on previously empty threats. A domestic violence speech injunction
would deter the batterer from making this report and might give the
victim the security she needs to leave the abusive relationship.
While no court has adjudicated the constitutionality of such an
injunction, it is clear that the prohibition on prior restraints and strict
scrutiny analysis will pose significant challenges. However, analysis
of First Amendment jurisprudence suggests that under certain
circumstances such a restriction will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny analysis ensures that these restrictions will not
have any significant corrosive effect on the Free Speech Clause. The
257. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 4, 61,144 (1987) (citing
the high incidence of further abuse and homicide upon separation); Mahoney, supra note
1, at 6 ("At the moment of separation or attempted separation.., the batterer's quest for
control often becomes most acutely violent and potentially lethal."). According to one
study at least half of women who leave their abusers are followed, attacked or harassed by
them. Id. at 64. Another study revealed that half of interspousal homicides occurred after
the partners had separated. Id.
258. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 65-66.
259. These anecdotes are derived from my own practice representing victims of
domestic violence in the District of Columbia over the past five years.
Fall 20011 WHY DOESN'T SHE LEAVE?
60 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 29:
state's interests must substantially outweigh the value of the
batterer's speech for this injunction to be constitutional. Further, the
injunction must be narrowly tailored and alternative avenues for
communication would need to be provided. While the nature of the
speech might be similar, if these threats to divulge information were
taking place between neighbors or co-workers the interests at issue
would be far less compelling. In contrast, in the domestic violence
context, the state's interests in the victim's privacy and the protection
of family safety weigh heavily against the batterer's speech rights.
Protection of these vital interests against destructive gossip suggests
that it is normatively important and constitutionally sound to
advocate for this type of injunction.
